This publication is presented to you through Paradigm Publishing Services
Mcgill-queen's University Press
Chapter
Licensed
Unlicensed
Requires Authentication
CHAPTER TEN The Reality of Rule-Following
-
Philip Pettit
You are currently not able to access this content.
You are currently not able to access this content.
Chapters in this book
- Front Matter i
- Contents v
- Acknowledgments vii
- The Contributors ix
- Introduction 1
- Skepticism and Semantic Knowledge 16
- The Individual Strikes Back 28
- Wittgenstein on Following a Rule1 45
- Wittgenstein, Kripke and Non-Reductionism about Meaning 81
- Kripke on Wittgenstein on Rules* 92
- Critical Notice of Colin McGinn’s Wittgenstein on Meaning 108
- Meaning and Intention as Judgement Dependent 129
- The Rule-Following Considerations1 141
- The Reality of Rule-Following 188
- Truth Rules, Hoverflies, and the Kripke-Wittgenstein Paradox 209
- Kripke on Wittgenstein on Normativity* 234
- Meaning, Use and Truth 260
- Kripke’s Normativity Argument1 274
- Guide to Further Reading 295
- Index 300
Chapters in this book
- Front Matter i
- Contents v
- Acknowledgments vii
- The Contributors ix
- Introduction 1
- Skepticism and Semantic Knowledge 16
- The Individual Strikes Back 28
- Wittgenstein on Following a Rule1 45
- Wittgenstein, Kripke and Non-Reductionism about Meaning 81
- Kripke on Wittgenstein on Rules* 92
- Critical Notice of Colin McGinn’s Wittgenstein on Meaning 108
- Meaning and Intention as Judgement Dependent 129
- The Rule-Following Considerations1 141
- The Reality of Rule-Following 188
- Truth Rules, Hoverflies, and the Kripke-Wittgenstein Paradox 209
- Kripke on Wittgenstein on Normativity* 234
- Meaning, Use and Truth 260
- Kripke’s Normativity Argument1 274
- Guide to Further Reading 295
- Index 300