How These Conceptions Answer a Fundamental Question

Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Frontmatter i
2. Contents vii
3. Preface ix
4. Acknowledgments xiii
5. 1. Scientific Explanation: Three General Conceptions
6. Introduction 1
7. Explanation versus Description 4
8. Other Types of Explanation 9
9. Laplacian Explanation 11
10. Three Basic Conceptions 15
11. An Outline of Strategy 21
12. 2. Statistical Explanation and Its Models
13. Introduction 24
14. Inductive-Statistical Explanation 27
15. The Statistical-Relevance Approach 36
16. 3. Objective Homogeneity
17. Epistemic Relativization 48
18. Randomness 55
19. Homogeneity 60
20. Some Philosophical Applications 72
21. Some Philosophical Reflections 76
22. 4. The Three Conceptions Revisited
23. The Epistemic Conception 84
24. The Modal Conception 111
25. The Ontic Conception 121
26. How These Conceptions Answer a Fundamental Question 124
27. Conclusions 133
28. 5. Causal Connections
29. Basic Problems 135
30. Two Basic Concepts 137
31. Processes 139
32. The 'At-At' Theory of Causal Propagation 147
33. 6. Causal Forks and Common Causes
34. Conjunctive Forks 158
35. Interactive Forks 168
36. Relations between Conjunctive and Interactive Forks 174
37. Perfect Forks 177
38. The Causal Structure of the World 178
39. Concluding Remarks 182
40. 7. Probabilistic Causality
41. Introduction 184
42. The Sufficiency/Necessity View 185
43. Statistical Relevance and Probabilistic Causality 190
44. Causality and Positive Relevance 192
45. Causal Processes and Propensities 202
46. 8. Theoretical Explanation
47. Introduction 206
48. Causal Connections and Common Causes 207
49. Explanatory versus Inferential Principles 211
50. The Common Cause Principle and Molecular Reality 213
51. The Explanatory Power of Theories 227
52. Empiricism and Realism 229
53. 9. The Mechanical Philosophy
54. Logic versus Mechanisms 239
55. Explanation in Quantum Mechanics 242
56. Explanation and Understanding 259
57. The Causal/Mechanical Model 267
58. The Final Contrast 276
59. Bibliography 280
60. Index 295