Chapters in this book

1. Frontmatter i
2. Contents vii
3. Preface xv
4. Chapter One: An overview 1
5. Part I: Individual and social choice
6. Chapter Two: The theory of consumer choice and demand 17
7. Chapter Three: Choice under uncertainty 71
8. Chapter Four: Dynamic choice 133
9. Chapter Five: Social choice and efficiency 149
10. Part II: The price mechanism
11. Chapter Six: Pure exchange and general equilibrium 187
12. Chapter Seven: The neoclassical firm 233
13. Chapter Eight: The competitive firm and perfect competition 263
14. Chapter Nine: Monopoly 299
15. Chapter Ten: Imperfect competition 325
16. Part III: Noncooperative game theory
17. Chapter Eleven: Modeling competitive situations 355
18. Chapter Twelve: Solution concepts for noncooperative games 387
19. Chapter Thirteen: Incomplete information and irrationality 463
20. Chapter Fourteen: Repeated play: Cooperation and reputation 503
21. Chapter Fifteen: Bilateral bargaining 551
22. Part IV: Topics in information economics
23. Chapter Sixteen: Moral hazard and incentives 577
24. Chapter Seventeen: Adverse selection and market signaling 625
25. Chapter Eighteen: The revelation principle and mechanism design 661
26. Part V: Firms and transactions
27. Chapter Nineteen: Theories of the firm 723
28. Chapter Twenty: Transaction cost economics and the firm 743
29. Postscript 771
30. Appendix One: Constrained optimization 775
31. Appendix Two: Dynamic programming 791
32. Index 817