Chapters in this book

1. Frontmatter i
2. Contents v
3. Preface to the Paperback ix
4. Preface xiii
5. 1. Introduction: Power, Welfare, Incentives, Values 1
6. PART I. Welfare: THE PROBLEM, AND A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
7. 2. The Evolution of the Administrative State 27
8. 3. The Purposes and Functional Modes of the Administrative State 48
9. 4. The Structure of the Administrative State 72
10. 5. Principles for Whether to Delegate to Independent Agencies 92
11. 6. Design Precepts for How to Delegate to Independent Agencies 109
12. 7. Applying the Principles for Delegation 127
13. PART II. Values: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY FOR INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
14. 8. Independent Agencies and Our Political Values and Beliefs (1) 173
15. 9. Independent Agencies and Our Political Values and Beliefs (2) 195
16. 10. Credible Commitment versus Democracy 221
17. 11. The Political- Values- and- Norms Robustness Test of the Principles for Delegation 236
18. 12. Insulated Agencies and Constitutionalism 272
19. PART III. Incentives: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IN THE REAL WORLD: INCENTIVES AND VALUES UNDER DIFFERENT CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES
20. 13. States’ Capacity for Principled Delegation to Deliver Credible Commitment 307
21. 14. The Problem of Vague Objectives 334
22. 15. Processes, Transparency, and Accountability 349
23. 16. The Limits of Design 378
24. PART IV. Power: Overmighty Citizens? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CENTRAL BANKING: POWER, LEGITIMACY, AND RECONSTRUCTION
25. 17. Central Banking and the Politics of Monetary Policy 405
26. 18. The Shift in Ideas 414
27. 19. Tempting the Gods 426
28. 20. A Money-Credit Constitution 438
29. 21. Central Banking and the Regulatory State 461
30. 22. Central Banking and the Fiscal State 482
31. 23. Central Banks and the Emergency State 503
32. 24. Overmighty Citizens After All? 525
33. Conclusion. Unelected Democrats 546
34. APPENDIX 569
35. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 573
36. BIBLIOGRAPHY 579
37. INDEX 611