A Positive Theory of Constitutional Judicial Review: Evidence from Singapore and Taiwan
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Eric Ip
The consensus over independent constitutional judicial review – that it inevitably stems from electoral and inter-branch competition – has been weakened by recent empirical discoveries; however, empiricists have yet to offer a coherent explanation why non-competitive, authoritarian, governments would tolerate constitutional courts that strike down their legislation. This article proposes a “Constitutional Investment Theory” that solves this puzzle: expressive symbolism is central to these regimes’ calculus for acquiescing in the activation of judicial review; the variable perdurability of judicial review depends on how much trust the regime invest in the judiciary; and activism in judicial review is the likelier to emerge the higher the transaction costs of retaliating against offending courts. Evidence from Singapore and pre-2000 Taiwan lends support to this theory.
©2012 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Article
- Deterrence of Antitrust Violations: Do Actions for Damages Matter in Japan?
- Legal Framework for the Single Window Concept in ASEAN: A Successful Movement towards Trade Facilitation in East Asian Countries
- A Bottom-Up Approach for Climate Change: The Trade Experience
- Taiwan, Tourism, and Trademarks: Protecting Aboriginal Culture
- A Positive Theory of Constitutional Judicial Review: Evidence from Singapore and Taiwan
