Accumulation and Growth in the Shadow of Conflicts
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Peter J. Stauvermann
We introduce a simple growth model to investigate how the evolution of a society is influenced by international conflicts. We come to the result that in the long run three equilibria are possible; a war equilibrium, a peace equilibrium or cycles between war and peace. Which kind of equilibrium will be achieved depends on the effectiveness of weapons, the distribution of capital, intertemporal preferences and the production technology. In general, we conclude that the achievement of a long-lasting sustainable peace is possible, if we restrict the degree of economic inequality. The model delivers a normative reasoning for the foundation and the conservation of the European Union, even if redistribution of national incomes must take place to conserve it.
©2012 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Research Paper
- Accumulation and Growth in the Shadow of Conflicts
- The Intensity of the Rwandan Genocide: Measures from the Gacaca Records
- Provision of Public Goods with the Presence of Inter-Class Conflicts
- Trade and Political, Military, and Economic Relations
- Remittances and the Financing of Terrorism In Sub-Saharan Africa: 1974 - 2006
- Letter
- A Surprising Result Encountered in Various Extensions of the Traditional Deterrence Game
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Research Paper
- Accumulation and Growth in the Shadow of Conflicts
- The Intensity of the Rwandan Genocide: Measures from the Gacaca Records
- Provision of Public Goods with the Presence of Inter-Class Conflicts
- Trade and Political, Military, and Economic Relations
- Remittances and the Financing of Terrorism In Sub-Saharan Africa: 1974 - 2006
- Letter
- A Surprising Result Encountered in Various Extensions of the Traditional Deterrence Game
