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Chapter 6. Comparative concepts are not a different kind of thing

  • Tabea Reiner
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Abstract

This contribution challenges the by now established notion of comparative concepts; in particular, it can be read as a (delayed) response to Haspelmath (2010). Like Haspelmath’s original paper, the present one is theoretical in essence, with examples used primarily for illustration. My main point is that Haspelmath’s comparative concepts are, despite his claims to the contrary, simply crosslinguistic categories. This point has been made before; however, I offer two new ingredients to the argument: first, an explicit definition of the crucial term instantiation, allowing, among other things, a reaction to Haspelmath’s (2018b) newest defence of comparative concepts, and second, an alternative approach involving multiple monotonic inheritance. The contribution as a whole, though being theoretical, strives to argue as framework-neutrally as possible; in particular I remain agnostic about the existence and nature of Universal Grammar in any sense.

Abstract

This contribution challenges the by now established notion of comparative concepts; in particular, it can be read as a (delayed) response to Haspelmath (2010). Like Haspelmath’s original paper, the present one is theoretical in essence, with examples used primarily for illustration. My main point is that Haspelmath’s comparative concepts are, despite his claims to the contrary, simply crosslinguistic categories. This point has been made before; however, I offer two new ingredients to the argument: first, an explicit definition of the crucial term instantiation, allowing, among other things, a reaction to Haspelmath’s (2018b) newest defence of comparative concepts, and second, an alternative approach involving multiple monotonic inheritance. The contribution as a whole, though being theoretical, strives to argue as framework-neutrally as possible; in particular I remain agnostic about the existence and nature of Universal Grammar in any sense.

Heruntergeladen am 16.9.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1075/tsl.132.06rei/pdf
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