7. Nothing in mammalian psychology makes sense except in light of primary-process affective capacities

Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Prelim pages i
2. Table of contents v
3. 1. Introduction 1
4. 2. In defense of multiple Core Affects 31
5. 3. From a psychological constructionist perspective 79
6. 4. “Nature proposes…and science disposes” tertiary vs primary process approaches to emotions and affects 119
7. 5. Preliminary comments on Panksepp 129
8. 6. Discrete emotions 135
9. 7. Nothing in mammalian psychology makes sense except in light of primary-process affective capacities 155
10. 8. Lessons for affective science from a metascience of ‘molecular and cellular cognition’ 175
11. 9. Affect as appraisal 189
12. 10. What should theories of emotion be about? 203
13. 11. Valence, reductionism, and the ineffable 225
14. 12. Functional and empirical presuppositions in Russell and Panksepp 243
15. 13. Comparison of affect program theories, appraisal theories, and psychological construction theories 257
16. 14. Final remarks 279
17. 15. My reflections on commentaries and concluding perspectives 301
18. 16. Concluding observations 321
19. Index 347