Emotional optimality and moral force
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Kristján Kristjánsson
Abstract
This paper begins by exploring the ways, including moral ways, in which emotions are evaluated, and the ways in which emotions are considered – by semi-emotivists and by semi-rationalists – to track moral value. The notion of emotional authenticity is discussed and also the need to move beyond authenticity into the moral realm. The question is raised of whether an episodic emotion can legitimately carry overriding moral force in a specific case, C, even though it has been shown to be morally amiss with respect to the details of C? The notion of moral “emotional optimality” is introduced and various cases examined in which morally sub-optimal emotions may seem to have overriding moral force. Some of the cases do not stand up to scrutiny, but others remain persuasive: cases in which a sub-optimal emotion instantiates an invaluable disposition that cannot be sustained psychologically without sporadic sub-optimal manifestations, and cases in which a sub-optimal emotion cannot be changed cost-effectively.
Abstract
This paper begins by exploring the ways, including moral ways, in which emotions are evaluated, and the ways in which emotions are considered – by semi-emotivists and by semi-rationalists – to track moral value. The notion of emotional authenticity is discussed and also the need to move beyond authenticity into the moral realm. The question is raised of whether an episodic emotion can legitimately carry overriding moral force in a specific case, C, even though it has been shown to be morally amiss with respect to the details of C? The notion of moral “emotional optimality” is introduced and various cases examined in which morally sub-optimal emotions may seem to have overriding moral force. Some of the cases do not stand up to scrutiny, but others remain persuasive: cases in which a sub-optimal emotion instantiates an invaluable disposition that cannot be sustained psychologically without sporadic sub-optimal manifestations, and cases in which a sub-optimal emotion cannot be changed cost-effectively.
Chapters in this book
- Prelim pages i
- Table of contents v
- Introduction 1
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Part I. Authenticity, emotions, and the self
- Self-love and the structure of personal values 11
- The self of shame 33
- Authenticity and self-governance 51
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Part II. Ramifications of emotional authenticity
- Picturing the authenticity of emotions 71
- Status, gender, and the politics of emotional authenticity 91
- How to be “emotional”? 113
- Authenticity and occupational emotions 133
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Part III. Emotional authenticity in ethics and moral psychology
- Is emotivism more authentic than cognitivism? 155
- Emotional authenticity as a central basis of moral psychology 179
- Authentic emotions as ethical guides? 195
- Emotional optimality and moral force 215
- Index 235
Chapters in this book
- Prelim pages i
- Table of contents v
- Introduction 1
-
Part I. Authenticity, emotions, and the self
- Self-love and the structure of personal values 11
- The self of shame 33
- Authenticity and self-governance 51
-
Part II. Ramifications of emotional authenticity
- Picturing the authenticity of emotions 71
- Status, gender, and the politics of emotional authenticity 91
- How to be “emotional”? 113
- Authenticity and occupational emotions 133
-
Part III. Emotional authenticity in ethics and moral psychology
- Is emotivism more authentic than cognitivism? 155
- Emotional authenticity as a central basis of moral psychology 179
- Authentic emotions as ethical guides? 195
- Emotional optimality and moral force 215
- Index 235
