Why assume UG?
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Dieter Wunderlich
Abstract
This paper deliberates for a number of linguistic features whether they are part of UG, i.e., specific to human language, or whether they are adapted from other cognitive capacities which were evolutionarily prior to language. Among others, it is argued that the distinction between predication and reference already belongs to the conceptual system, whereas the distinction between verb and noun (which is not identical with the former one) is one of the innovations of UG. It is furthermore argued that syntax in the sense that it deals with displacement (‘movement’) is a property of human language that lies outside of UG.
The paper then discusses whether linguistic typology can contribute to our knowledge of UG, and whether aiming at this is a reasonable goal for typological research. It stands against Newmeyer’s position (this special issue) that typological evidence is essentially irrelevant for the construction of UG, as well as against Haspelmath’s position (this special issue), who argues that typological research can do without a concept of UG.
Abstract
This paper deliberates for a number of linguistic features whether they are part of UG, i.e., specific to human language, or whether they are adapted from other cognitive capacities which were evolutionarily prior to language. Among others, it is argued that the distinction between predication and reference already belongs to the conceptual system, whereas the distinction between verb and noun (which is not identical with the former one) is one of the innovations of UG. It is furthermore argued that syntax in the sense that it deals with displacement (‘movement’) is a property of human language that lies outside of UG.
The paper then discusses whether linguistic typology can contribute to our knowledge of UG, and whether aiming at this is a reasonable goal for typological research. It stands against Newmeyer’s position (this special issue) that typological evidence is essentially irrelevant for the construction of UG, as well as against Haspelmath’s position (this special issue), who argues that typological research can do without a concept of UG.
Chapters in this book
- Prelim pages i
- Table of contents v
- Preface vii
- What counts as evidence in linguistics? 1
- Typological evidence and Universal Grammar 51
- Remarks on the relation between language typology and Universal Grammar 75
- Does linguistic explanation presuppose linguistic description? 81
- Remarks on description and explanation in grammar 109
- Author’s response 113
- From UG to Universals 117
- Form, meaning and speakers in the evolution of language 139
- Author’s response 143
- Why assume UG? 147
- What kind of evidence could refute the UG hypothesis? 175
- Author’s response 179
- A question of relevance 181
- The Relevance of Variation 209
- Author’s response 215
- Universals, innateness and explanation in second language acquisition 217
- ‘Internal’ versus ‘external’ universals 241
- Author’s response 245
- What counts as evidence in historical linguistics? 249
- Abstraction and performance 283
- Author’s response 287
- Index 291
Chapters in this book
- Prelim pages i
- Table of contents v
- Preface vii
- What counts as evidence in linguistics? 1
- Typological evidence and Universal Grammar 51
- Remarks on the relation between language typology and Universal Grammar 75
- Does linguistic explanation presuppose linguistic description? 81
- Remarks on description and explanation in grammar 109
- Author’s response 113
- From UG to Universals 117
- Form, meaning and speakers in the evolution of language 139
- Author’s response 143
- Why assume UG? 147
- What kind of evidence could refute the UG hypothesis? 175
- Author’s response 179
- A question of relevance 181
- The Relevance of Variation 209
- Author’s response 215
- Universals, innateness and explanation in second language acquisition 217
- ‘Internal’ versus ‘external’ universals 241
- Author’s response 245
- What counts as evidence in historical linguistics? 249
- Abstraction and performance 283
- Author’s response 287
- Index 291
