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Transcendental deduction of predicative structure in Kant and Brandom

Abstract

On the Fregean account of predication, which Brandom and Quine share, the predicative structure of a judgment consists in a certain deductive order of a suitable domain of judgments. A rival and, as will be argued, superior account of predication can be found in Kant, according to which the source of the predicative structure of thought is not an inferential order among thoughts, but thought’s relation to intuition. Not only do intuitions provide thought with content but the dependence of thought on intuition is the principle of its form. The development of this systematic claim requires, or yields, a new reading of the Analogies of Experience.

Abstract

On the Fregean account of predication, which Brandom and Quine share, the predicative structure of a judgment consists in a certain deductive order of a suitable domain of judgments. A rival and, as will be argued, superior account of predication can be found in Kant, according to which the source of the predicative structure of thought is not an inferential order among thoughts, but thought’s relation to intuition. Not only do intuitions provide thought with content but the dependence of thought on intuition is the principle of its form. The development of this systematic claim requires, or yields, a new reading of the Analogies of Experience.

Chapters in this book

  1. Prelim pages i
  2. Table of contents v
  3. About the Authors vii
  4. Introduction 1
  5. Formal truth and objective reference in an inferentialist setting 7
  6. The nature of meaning: Brandom versus Chomsky 35
  7. The father, the son, and the daughter: Sellars, Brandom, and Millikan 53
  8. A deflationist theory of intentionality? Brandom's analysis of de re specifying attitude-ascriptions 65
  9. Transcendental deduction of predicative structure in Kant and Brandom 83
  10. Meaning, justification, and truth 99
  11. Motivating inferentialism: Comments on Making it Explicit (Ch. 2) 109
  12. Pragmatics, Pittsburgh style 127
  13. Brandom's solution of the objectivity problem 147
  14. Keeping track of individuals: Brandom's analysis of Kripke's puzzle and the content of belief 163
  15. Scorekeeping in a defective language game 187
  16. Response 209
  17. Index of persons 231
  18. Index of topics 233
The Pragmatics of <i>Making it Explicit</i>
This chapter is in the book The Pragmatics of <i>Making it Explicit</i>
https://doi.org/10.1075/bct.15.07rod

Chapters in this book

  1. Prelim pages i
  2. Table of contents v
  3. About the Authors vii
  4. Introduction 1
  5. Formal truth and objective reference in an inferentialist setting 7
  6. The nature of meaning: Brandom versus Chomsky 35
  7. The father, the son, and the daughter: Sellars, Brandom, and Millikan 53
  8. A deflationist theory of intentionality? Brandom's analysis of de re specifying attitude-ascriptions 65
  9. Transcendental deduction of predicative structure in Kant and Brandom 83
  10. Meaning, justification, and truth 99
  11. Motivating inferentialism: Comments on Making it Explicit (Ch. 2) 109
  12. Pragmatics, Pittsburgh style 127
  13. Brandom's solution of the objectivity problem 147
  14. Keeping track of individuals: Brandom's analysis of Kripke's puzzle and the content of belief 163
  15. Scorekeeping in a defective language game 187
  16. Response 209
  17. Index of persons 231
  18. Index of topics 233
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