De Gruyter Studies in Military History

Germany was the epicenter of the Cold War. Across the Iron Curtain, hundreds of thousands of soldiers faced each other, and if World War III were to break out, contemporaries feared, surely it would happen here. The country’s frontline status made it an El Dorado for spies, who gathered information on military targets, penetrated political parties, and trained partisans for stay-behind operations. For the Americans, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) came to take the lead in this silent – and sometimes not so silent – contest. In the heyday of the Cold War, the agency’s German station employed nearly two thousand officers – in addition to countless spies and informants. Ultimately, this covert empire reported to the CIA station chief in West Germany and his deputy. And for many years, either of those positions was held by Gordon Matthews Stewart.

Gordon Stewart was well prepared for this assignment. He studied German history and literature during the 1930s and lived in Munich and Hamburg as a visiting student. Here, he personally witnessed the Nazi takeover, even catching a glimpse of Adolf Hitler at one of his notorious rallies. When the United States entered the war in 1941, the newly established Office of Strategic Services (OSS) recruited him as a specialist on German affairs. In the summer of 1945, he arrived in Germany with an OSS detachment. Eventually, the OSS morphed into the CIA, and Gordon Stewart would run the agency’s espionage organization in Germany for some twenty years. 　

From CIA headquarters in Heidelberg, Karlsruhe, Frankfurt, and eventually, Bonn, Mr. Stewart directed all intelligence operations in central Europe. Initially, he hunted down Nazi war criminals, but the Cold War compelled him to bend his efforts toward the Soviet bloc. During the 1950s, Mr. Stewart directed espionage operations against East Germany, organized the training of Ukrainian partisans at U.S. bases in Bavaria, and participated in a scheme to dig a tunnel into East Berlin to eavesdrop on Soviet and East German communications. He also recruited and handled sources inside the West German government, including the chief of the Bundesnachrichtendienst, Reinhard Gehlen; the highest-ranking West German military officer, General Adolf Heusinger; and top policy-makers of the Christian and social democratic parties. 　　

Mr. Stewart’s memoirs, introduced by renowned intelligence scholar Thomas Boghardt, offer not only a fascinating look inside the CIA’s largest overseas station; they also tell the story of a deeply conscientious and highly accomplished intelligence officer, whose experience, intellect, and moral compass shaped American policy toward Germany and Europe during the turbulent years of the early Cold War.　

Russia's attack on Ukraine marked the beginning of Europe's most consequential war since 1945. The European Union is taking in war refugees, imposing sanctions, and financing arms deliveries, while the superpower USA is setting the course. The second, updated and expanded edition addresses this current development, which in turn underscores the importance of military history for historical and political education and the added value of an inter- and transnational approach.Military dimensions of the past are viewed from a European perspective that includes Russia and the US.
Thirty renowned historians examine cross-border relations since the 19th century. With numerous illustrations, graphics, and maps, this innovative volume sheds light on the upheavals of war and peace, the transformation of civil-military relations, the representation of the military in self-images and images of others, and the relationships between armed forces in military alliances since the Napoleonic Wars from a transnational perspective—a valuable guide for historians and the broader public alike.

This work examines the CFE Treaty as a factor in Russia’s foreign and security policy. Moscow showed amazing persistence in their relationship with the "cornerstone of European security." Their approach to the treaty was a genuine attempt to shape the security environment in Europe and the former USSR. The treaty also enabled the dismantling of large conventional forces as they returned from Eastern Europe and transitioned into the armies of the newly independent states of the former USSR. The CFE Treaty, though, proved ineffective at constraining the enlargement of NATO. Simultaneously, Moscow’s foreign and security policy evolved from one that focused on the domestic development of the country to that of a more confident state reasserting itself as a great power. Drawing extensively on primary sources and analyses by Russian authors, this book employs two historical narratives, case studies, and a conceptual framework to show that while Moscow remained engaged with the CFE Treaty, undesired effects on Russia’s national interests gradually accrued at the expense of desired ones, leading Vladimir Putin to withdraw Russia from the treaty as an act of de-coupling from the "collective West." This book is relevant to scholars and policymakers who want to understand Russia’s approach to arms control as an element of military security.

This is a study of sea power and maritime strategy in the Classical Greek world. More than just a study of navies and battles, it examines how the sea was used to influence events ashore and how the use of naval power combined with land power had a defining impact on the period. After an examination of the oft-overlooked practical issues of navigation and administration, the book explores the idea of a ‘maritime consciousness’ in Greece and how this shaped the way the Greeks engaged in war. Naval operations from the Persian Wars down to the rise of Thebes are examined at the operational and strategic level, including a catalogue of the hundreds of different maritime operations from the 5^th and 4^th centuries BCE. Further, while the great sea power Athens is most prominent, it looks at other city-states to examine how they utilised sea power. This new approach uses modern theory to highlight some enduring lessons of sea power. It demonstrates that Classical scholars should embrace sea power as an important concept in the Greek world. Modern scholars of naval and strategic studies should cast their gaze further back in time when looking for lessons in sea power. This book helps to bridge the scholarship between these two disciplines.

The theme of the book is the creation of tactics for littoral warfare – as opposed to the more common blue ocean perspective. Themes are how NATO perceived the goals of the enemy; the purposes of the NATO organisations, the military instruments they had to organise, the organization of cooperation among units from sovereign states, and how they tested their military capabilities. Research is based on war plans and tactics of the Danish and West German navies and their planned support from air forces. We follow the modernisations of the navies from guns to missiles. Tactical discussions among military top offi cers are laid bare, and intelligence reports about the Warsaw Pact and its military capabilities are presented. Exercises are analysed based on the military reports.

Until 1979, homosexual men were systematically exempt from military service in the Bundeswehr. Although homosexuality alone was no longer a cause for being unfit for service, the principle applied to homosexual soldiers was: compulsory military service yes, career no. In most cases, same-sex orientation made it impossible to become an officer. And it was classified as a security risk. It was not until 2000 that the Federal Ministry of Defense changed its course.

Klaus Storkmann is the first to examine the Bundeswehr's handling of homosexual soldiers on the basis of interviews, court records and papers of the Federal Ministry of Defense. A comparison with other armed forces and the public service in the Federal Republic of Germany places the Bundeswehr actions in a larger context. The study proves that homosexuality has always been an issue in the military and continues to be so in many places; it is based on retrospective views on former German armed forces, in particular the National People's Army of the GDR, and includes side glances at armies of other states.

The American military occupation of Germany lasted five years. During this time, Germany made great strides along the road from fascism to democracy, Europe became the fulcrum of the Cold War, and the United States emerged as a global superpower. This book corrects numerous misunderstandings and fills many gaps in our knowledge about the occupation.

The years 1900 to 1954 marked the transformation from an exotic, colonized "Far East" to a more autonomous, prominent "Asia Pacific". This anthology examines the grand strategies of great powers as they vied for influence and ultimately hegemony in the region. At the turn of the twentieth century, the main contestants included the venerable British Empire and the aspiring Japan and United States. The unwieldy leviathan of China, the European imperial holdings in Southeast Asia, and the expanses of the western Pacific emerged as battlegrounds in literal and geopolitical terms. Other less powerful nations, such as India, Burma, Australia, and French Indochina, also exercised agency in crafting grand strategies to further their interests and in their interactions with those great powers. Among the many factors affecting all nations invested in the Asia Pacific were such traditional elements as economics, military power, and diplomacy, as well as fluid traits like ideology, culture, and personality. The era saw the decline of British and European influence in the Asia Pacific, the rise and fall of Japanese imperialism, the emergence of American primacy, the ongoing struggle for independence in Southeast Asia, and China’s resurrection as a contender for hegemony. Great powers shifted and so too did their grand strategies.

The Military Revolution and Revolutions in Military Affairs updates two central debates in military history--the one surrounding the concept of military revolution, and the one on military affairs--whilst advancing original research in both fields. Only a handful of publications consider the military revolution and the RMA in tandem. This book breaks new ground conceptually and appeals to an exceptionally large and diverse readership. Comparative revisionist studies of the military revolution and RMA better enable us to comprehend the historical continuum and reveal the new RMA for what it is. And for what it is shortly to become.

This book presents original contributions within the "epicentre" of the military revolution debate, the 1500s, with an emphasis on gunpowder revolution (offensively and defensively). The connections with the Revolution in Military Affairs are then made explicit by scholars, a practitioner, and an analyst, with an emphasis on airborne lethal autonomous weapons systems. This is a chronologically broad and unique methodological approach to a historical debate that begs for clarification as we enter an era where killer robots will almost certainly take from humans their monopoly on violence.

20 July 1944 is usually associated with the bomb plot to murder Hitler. However, what distinguishes Colonel Stauffenberg’s plan from all others is that the attempt on the Führer’s life was only to be the initial stage of a full military coup d’état. The aim was to overthrow the murderous regime, and to end the war as soon as possible.

The conspiracy has long been analyzed from political, social, religious, or moral points of view. This book asks what the military dimension of the plan was. What traditions in the German army were at work, how was planning and preparation done, and why did the plot fail eventually? What is more: how did the conspiracy affect the German armies created in East and West after World War　II, and also the Austrian Army?

As the politicians among the conspirators thought in categories of Imperial Germany or at least the Weimar Republic, the officers among them were conditioned by the Reichswehr. Yet, Stauffenberg and some others were also bright intellectuals who were willing to incorporate their war experience into their plans, rendering them surprisingly modern at times.

The coup d’état had been planned as meticulously as circumstances in war-torn Berlin allowed. However, as most officers had foreseen, once it became public knowledge that Hitler had survived Stauffenberg’s bomb, army units refused to act. The myth surrounding the "Führer" effectively prevented any military action against him.

Still, the failed uprising had its effects: the regime took the opportunity to tilt the balance of power further in favor of Himmler and his fiefdom (SS, Gestapo, Police), to the detriment of the army which Hitler felt was too reactionary anyway.

The leadership of the West German Bundeswehr always saw the failed uprising as part of its tradition, but it took time for this attitude to percolate down to the rank and file. For decades, some of the former Wehrmacht soldiers viewed Stauffenberg and his friends as "traitors".

The book is the first to approach this important event in German history from a specifically military point of view, and that results in some surprising new results.

The period between the mid-1880s and the First World War was the high point of the navalist movement - but the idea of 'navalism' took many forms, and meant different problems and different solutions to various groups within British society and the British government. New Crusade examines one form of the British navalist movement: directed navalism. As opposed to the broader cultural conception of British naval power, directed navalism consisted of a cooperative, symbiotic working relationship between three elite and self-selecting groups: serving naval officers (professionals), naval correspondents and editors working for national newspapers and periodicals (press), and members of Parliament who dealt with naval issues (politicians). Directed navalism meant agitation for a specific, achievable goal. It was the bedrock upon which the more popular and ultimately more successful cultural navalism of fleet reviews and music halls was built. Though directed navalism collapsed before the First World War, it was extraordinarily successful in its time, and it was a necessary precursor for the creation of a national discourse in which cultural navalism could thrive. Its rise and fall is the story of this book.