Volume 59, Issue 4 -

Vorspann Seit die Zeitgeschichte die zweite Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts als Forschungsfeld erschlossen hat, steht sie mehr denn je vor der Herausforderung, wie sie mit den Deutungsangeboten der Sozialwissenschaften umgehen soll. Bloße Adaption oder selbstbewusste Behauptung und damit Beharrung auf den spezifischen Regeln, die der Zeitgeschichte eigen sind? Rüdiger Graf und Kim Priemel, Protagonisten einer gegenwartsnahen Zeitgeschichte, stellen sich diesen Fragen. Sie kritisieren (und illustrieren) die unbekümmerte Entlehnung sozialwissenschaftlicher Theorien und Methoden, plädieren aber gleichzeitig dafür, das eigene Methodenarsenal zu erweitern – durch die reflektierte behutsame Nutzung der Nachbardisziplinen, deren Begriffe und Methoden historisiert, kontextualisiert und mit der genuinen Herangehensweise der Zeitgeschichte verbunden werden müssen. Abstract Unlike other historiographic disciplines contemporary history has to define itself in a both intra- and interdisciplinary arena. While the debate on when exactly contemporary history begins has accompanied its practitioners from the very beginning, the question as to what sets it apart from other social sciences has long been suspended. With the fields of research moving rapidly into the last decades of the twentieth century this problem becomes increasingly urgent. Not only does contemporary history investigate the same empirical phenomena that have already been analysed by sociologists, economists, and political scientists, it also appropriates the theories constructed by these neighbouring disciplines. The present article exemplarily outlines this borrowing practice looking at the careers of theoretical models such as value change, international interdependence and economic structural change first in their own fields, then among historians. Beyond the easily identifiable hazards of using the data compiled by contemporary social scientists and reproducing their findings, the more fundamental problem lies in the all-too-easy adoption of the theories by which these have been produced. The heuristic and explanatory appeal of these theories results from their epistemic proximity to the hermeneutic horizon of contemporary historians and leads to the adoption rather than critical reflection of such models. This danger, however, also leads to the great potential of contemporary history which should historicise and look beyond the perspectives of contemporary social scientists.

Vorspann Die verstörende publizistische Begleitmusik zum „Amt“ ist fast verstummt. Nun haben die Fachleute das Wort. Einer davon ist Michael Mayer, der die Debatte zum Anlass nimmt, sich intensiv mit der Personalstruktur des Außenministeriums im Dritten Reich und ihrem tiefgreifenden Wandel nach 1938 zu befassen. Sein Befund ist eindeutig: Es waren vor allem die neu geschaffenen, von überzeugten Nationalsozialisten geleiteten Sonderreferate, die im Auswärtigen Amt die Judenpolitik bestimmten und bereitwillig mit dem Reichssicherheitshauptamt kooperierten. Der Einfluss der alten Diplomaten in den traditionellen Abteilungen hingegen blieb in dieser Frage – trotz aller, mitunter bestürzender Anpassungsleistungen – gering. Abstract The final report of the Commission of Historians Dealing with the History of the German Foreign Office during the Nazi Dictatorship and the Federal Republic has kindled a heated debate. Here the results of the commission are checked by systematic research. Mostly the article focuses on the question as to which new insights can be gained by engaging in an internal differentiation within the Foreign Office. The Commission of Historians has disputed that such a differentiation leads to an increase in understanding. For the first time, the staff of the various desks which were (among other things) responsible for the persecution of the Jews and the Political Department are compared. Here it becomes clear that fundamental differences existed within the Foreign Office on a hitherto unrecognised scale. What were the consequences? To answer this question, the positions espoused by the Judenreferat [Jewish desk] as well as the Political and Legal Departments during the Holocaust are examined. In this manner it is possible to determine a balanced internal differentiation within the Foreign Office which takes the existing internal commonalities and differences into account without downplaying its extensive participation in Nazi crimes. The results of the Commission can thus be corrected and supplemented comprehensively.

Vorspann In kaum einem anderen westeuropäischen Staat wurde die deutsche Reaktion auf den Terrorismus der RAF so scharf kritisiert wie in Frankreich. Präsident Giscard d‘Estaing unterstützte den Kurs der Bundesregierung. Die einflussreiche französische Linke hingegen zögerte nicht, die Bundesrepublik als „Polizeistaat“ zu diffamieren. Warum? Sah man in den Deutschen 30 Jahre nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg noch immer „Erbfeinde“, die vom Weg zur Demokratie abgekommen waren und erneut rückfällig wurden? Markus Lammert vom Institut für Zeitgeschichte zeigt, dass die gallige französische Kritik viele Wurzeln hatte. Vor allem waren es aktuelle innenpolitische Probleme, die auf dem Rücken des Nachbarlandes ausgetragen wurden. Abstract The West German “Internal Security” policy of the 1970s was harshly criticised in France. In many sections of the French Left, the Federal Republic was seen as a state which was abolishing the rule of law in its struggle against terrorism. Markus Lammert traces the different responses of the French critics, among them left-wing extremists as well as left-liberal politicians, who were soon to move into government positions. Their motives cannot be reduced to a historically founded “anti-Germanism”. Mostly, the Federal Republic and its struggle with terrorism served as a projection screen for internal political conflicts within France itself. The extension of the rule of law within the Fifth Republic, extended civil liberties and improved human rights protections were among the central themes of the French Left during the 1970s. Additionally transnational German-French networks fostered cross-border protest mobilisation against the anti-terrorism policy of the German government.

Vorspann Wie viele sowjetische Soldaten gerieten während des Zweiten Weltkriegs in deutsche Kriegsgefangenschaft? Wie groß ist die Zahl derjenigen Gefangenen, die individuell registriert wurden? In welchen Regionen und Lagern waren sie untergebracht? Dies sind keine nebensächlichen Fragen, denn die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen waren nach den Juden die größte Opfergruppe nationalsozialistischer Vernichtungspolitik. Nachdem Reinhard Otto, Rolf Keller und Jens Nagel erstmals präzise Zahlen für die einzelnen Lager errechnet hatten (VfZ Oktober 2008), sind ihre Ergebnisse auf Kritik gestoßen (VfZ Juli 2010). Mit dieser Erwiderung geht die Debatte, die über diese Frage entbrannt ist, in ihre letzte Runde. Abstract Haritonow and Müller consider our proposed method of using identity tags to establish the number of registered Soviet prisoners of war unsuitable because the number of data records has more than doubled during the course of their indexing project. A comparable approach would then result in an unrealistic total of more than 10 million prisoners. Yet these authors have completely misunderstood our line of inquiry, which is not at all about the total number of prisoners. A similar superficiality can be observed in the figures they present, which are uncritically extracted from their database, demonstrably resulting in errors due to input errors, which in turn result from the erroneous interpretation of documents or simple typing mistakes. Additionally they exhibit limited familiarity with the written records of the Wehrmacht, now mostly held by the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, so that many of the documents quoted by them are not adequately contextualised. These deficiencies confirm the devastating assessment of an evaluation committee which stated that the team in Dresden led by Müller should in future focus on the humanitarian aspect of the project and leave research to others. After thorough examination of our past deliberations we see no reason to question our method and results; the corrections resulting from the enlargement of the database are within the bandwidth we predicted. One may thus continue to assume that about 3 million soldiers of the Red Army were transferred to the OKW area and were registered individually as prisoners of war between 1941 and 1945.

Vorspann Nach dem Mauerbau kehrte in der DDR noch lange keine Ruhe ein. Es rumorte überall – in der Industrie ebenso wie in der Landwirtschaft, in den Kirchen nicht weniger als in den Universitäten. Der Staatssicherheit blieben diese Phänomene der Unruhe nicht verborgen, wie ihre interne Berichterstattung zeigt. Die Stasi ging hart dagegen vor und nutzte die angespannte Lage, um abweichendes Verhalten zu kriminalisieren und ihre eigenen Kompetenzbereiche immer weiter auszudehnen. Dem Mauerbau folgte so keine Demobilisierung, sondern eine Expansion des Geheimdienstes, der hinter der Mauer bald allgegenwärtig war. Abstract The source edited here is a hitherto unknown internal report of the East German State Security Service on security problems which occurred after the border in Berlin was closed off. The report unadornedly names the neuralgic areas which challenged State Security currently and in the short term. Mostly the report mentions industry, agriculture, construction and transportation, education (universities), the churches, members of the intelligentsia, adolescents as well as the rural population. On the one hand the report relates to protests and resistance behaviour patterns, which were directly or indirectly related to the construction of the Berlin Wall. On the other hand it recounts the enforcement of extensive political conformity under the conditions of the now “closed off” GDR.