Volume 8, Issue 1 - Intergenerational Justice; Guest Editors: Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Pamela Laufer-Ukeles

In his recent work, Parfit returns to the examination of the non-identity problem, but this time not in the context of a theory of value but as part of a Scanlonian theory of reasons for action. His project is to find a middle ground between pure impersonalism and the narrow person-affecting view so as to do justice to some of our fundamental intuitions regarding procreative choices. The aim of this article is to show that despite the sophisticated and challenging thought experiments and conceptual suggestions (mainly that of a “general person”), Parfit’s project fails and that we are left with the stark choice between personalism and impersonalism.

Under the human flourishing theory of property, owners have obligations, positive as well as negative, that they owe to members of the various communities to which they belong. But are the members of those communities limited to living persons, or do they include non-living persons as well, i.e., future persons and the dead? This Article argues that owners owe two sorts of obligation to non-living members of our generational communities, one general, the other specific. The general obligation is to provide future generations with the basic material background conditions that are necessary for them to be able to carry out what I call life-transcending projects that their forebears have transmitted to them. The specific obligation is project-specific; that is, its purpose is to enable successive generational community members to whom particular life-transcending projects have been forwarded to be carried out in their way. The future generational members to whom the project is transferred must also be given whatever resources or goods are necessary to carry the project forward in its intended way. I argue further that each generational community owes its predecessors the obligation to accept life-transcending projects transmitted to them by their forebears and make reasonable efforts to carry those projects forward into the future. The obligation is based on the past generational community members’ dependency on their successors for the projects to continue into the future, a matter that is constitutive of the project creators’ flourishing. This obligation is defeasible, rather than absolute, however.

This article suggests enacting an accession tax instead of the estate duty – which was repealed in Israel in 1981. This suggestion evolves from historical and normative explorations of the tension between perceptions of familial intergenerational property rights and justifications for the “death tax,” as termed by its opponents, i.e., estate and inheritance tax. First, the Article explores this tension as expressed in the history of the Israeli Estate Duty Law. This chronological survey reveals a move from the State’s taken-for-granted interest in revenue justifying the Law’s enactment in 1949; moving on to the “needy widow” and “poor orphan” in whose name the tax was attacked during the years 1959–1964, continuing to the abolition of the tax in 1981 in the name of efficiency and the right of the testator to transfer his wealth to his family, and finally cumulating with the targeting of tycoon dynasties that characterizes the recent calls for reintroducing the tax. Next, based on the rich literature on the subject, the Article maps the arguments for and against intergenerational wealth transfer taxation, placing the Israeli case in larger philosophical, political, and pragmatic contexts. Lastly, it associates the ideas of accession tax and “social inheritance” with inspirational sources for rethinking a realistic wealth transfer taxation to bridge the gap between notions of intergenerational familial rights and intergenerational social justice.

An intergenerational justice perspective requires that we look at the condition of the existing generation of children and those to be born in the future. Many millions of the existing generation of children are now in trouble and at high risk of never fulfilling their human potential. These children are in turn unlikely, if they live to produce children, to be capable of providing the nurturing parenting that the next generation will need. The article’s starting premises are that we should count child interests as of equivalent value to adult interests and that we do owe justice not just to the existing generation of children but to the next generations as well. Justice to the next generations means encouraging the creation of children who will have a good chance to enjoy the pleasures of life, children who will be born healthy and will be brought up by nurturing parents. Given these premises, there is much wrong with current reality and related policy. We now encourage the reproduction of more children than we can care for, provide limited child welfare enabling poor parents to better care for their children, and discourage adoption both domestic and international. We should reverse these policies. We should change the pronatalist and anti-contraception policies that encourage the reproduction of children who won’t likely be born healthy or receive nurturing care. We should provide child welfare so that poor parents who want to keep and raise their children can do so. We should encourage adoption, both domestic and international.

This article examines the issue of intergenerational cohabitation in the family home. Its primary purpose is to demonstrate that current analysis of internal conflicts in the home is lacking, both in terms of identifying the parties’ interests and characterizing the tensions involved. It focuses on a specific three-way conflict between two parents and their adult child and identifies each of their points of view: one parent who wants the adult child to move out, one parent who wants to continue to share her home with the adult child, and the adult child who wants to remain in the home. The article builds on rich multidisciplinary literature on the meaning of the home. This focus sheds new light on the conflict in two significant manners. First, the disagreement between the parents is characterized as a struggle between two conflicting visions of the home. Each of these visions reflects a different perception of the home, the family, and intergenerational commitments. Second, the focus on the home allows lawyers to acknowledge the position of the adult child, whose interest is completely not sufficiently taken into account in the conventional analysis.