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Parfit on the Non-identity Problem, Again

  • David Heyd EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: May 28, 2014
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Abstract

In his recent work, Parfit returns to the examination of the non-identity problem, but this time not in the context of a theory of value but as part of a Scanlonian theory of reasons for action. His project is to find a middle ground between pure impersonalism and the narrow person-affecting view so as to do justice to some of our fundamental intuitions regarding procreative choices. The aim of this article is to show that despite the sophisticated and challenging thought experiments and conceptual suggestions (mainly that of a “general person”), Parfit’s project fails and that we are left with the stark choice between personalism and impersonalism.

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to both the editors of this issue and an anonymous referee for having contributed significantly to the improvement of the Article.

Published Online: 2014-5-28
Published in Print: 2014-5-1

©2014 by De Gruyter

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