Volume 15, Issue 2

In a well-known article, Thomas Merrill posed the question “Is Public Nuisance a Tort?”, ultimately answering the question in the negative: “public nuisance is not, and never was, a tort.” This article reaches a different answer to Merrill’s question. It argues that Merrill was wrong to conclude that the characterisation of public nuisance as tort was a recent invention and that public nuisance claims are not privately actionable by individual plaintiffs. The article presents a defence of the private action for public nuisance and concludes, on both an historical and a theoretical account, that public nuisance has long been understood as a tort at common law, and for good reason.

The deployment of self-driving cars seems to be the recent focus in several parts of the world. The operation of Robotaxis, shuttles and other forms of public transport in the United States [the US], China and France are illustrative of these trends. Some other parts of the world, such as Germany and Japan, have simultaneously been gearing up to open public roads to such cars. The recent trends indicate that implementation of such modern technologies is no longer a moot point. Instead, current questions have increasingly focused on how, not whether, technological developments such as these may safely be adapted into public life. The introduction of self-driving cars has not been free of complexities. Among other things, their introduction necessitates an urgent overhaul of the regulatory environment to address the unique challenges of modern technologies. On the legislative front, the formulation of clear, coherent rules to ascertain the rights and liabilities of the various stakeholders, such as users vis-à-vis owners and manufacturers, for harm caused by such vehicles has become indispensable. On several occasions, the determination of liability for harm caused by self-driving vehicles would involve an interplay between domestic accident-liability rules and conflict-of-laws rules, especially where the damage has allegedly been caused by a car that has been manufactured overseas. In the absence of a treaty or Convention, several major jurisdictions such as Germany, France, the UK and China have developed legal principles in tandem with the introduction of self-driving cars. In contrast, India has been unmoved by these global developments. As the world progresses towards a legal discourse to revamp the regulatory framework to address the challenges of self-driving cars, India has stood firm in banning their operation. On the other hand, consumer anxieties concerning the operation of such vehicles on public roads in India have consistently risen – depicting the lack of trust in the ability of the current legislative framework to safeguard the rights and interests of the potential users and injury victims. This article attempts to identify the source of consumer concerns. It critically evaluates the predicaments that adjudicators and claimants may encounter if ordinary legal principles for motor vehicle injuries are extended to self-driving cars. The article demonstrates the uncertainties in Indian law on the subject of self-driving cars. The present legislative principles merely stipulate the mechanism to ascertain the liability for fatal or grave injuries caused by motor vehicles without concurrently prescribing the consequences of forms of damage that are not fatal or grave. Consequently, the paper recognizes the need for special rules on the regulation of self-driving cars and, accordingly, examines some workable solutions that Indian lawmakers may consider adopting if the ban on self-driving cars is eventually lifted.

The article is devoted to the issue of compensation for pure economic losses under Russian law. The category of pure economic losses came into the focus of Russian researchers relatively recently. Currently, the mainstream discussion of Russian scholars on the topic is based on the analysis of foreign cases and arguments related to them. Meanwhile, Russian case law has been enriched with precedents that can lead to a non-consistent way for resolving such kind of disputes. We propose the approach that the reimbursement of pure economic losses directly depends on the determination of the limits of tort liability or its conditions. Thereby, the comprehensive analysis of these conditions will make it possible to more clearly define the scope of the pure economic losses. Nevertheless, the conservatism of the Russian doctrine of tort law and the inconsistency of law enforcement does not always allow us to apply the usual conditions of tort liability as a method for analyzing pure economic losses under Russian law. Thus, we consider the arguments for and against the recovery of pure economic losses that have developed abroad and are often discussed by Russian scholars. Besides, the article deals with the most important cases in which the courts have granted claims for the recovery of the pure economic losses. Nevertheless, the reasoning of the courts does not always look satisfactory, since it has not always been supported by the strict analysis of conditions of tort liability. We also consider cases where courts’ attention to factual circumstances prevails over their legal analysis. Although these cases reflect the current Russian political agenda, we posit that they provide with valuable material for legal discussion on the issue of recovery of pure economic losses. The coherent application of liability conditions would have removed the political context of these cases and led to the concentration of courts’ attention on the legal details of the cases. As a result, the authors postulate the need to analyze the core of tort liability, i.e., its conditions. This will create a more subtle mechanism for setting up tort liability and develop immunity of tort law to exogenous factors related to the political context.