Volume 16, Issue 4

This article examines the supremacy accorded to free speech by the First Amendment of the American Constitution and in contrast, the European Union’s 2018 General Data Protection Regulation [GDPR] that highlights data protection. It compares speech as a fundamental human right in US law with the GDPR that champions individual and social rights in personal data as constraints upon speech action. It evaluates US and EU law in light of the history of the law of privacy and the protection of personal information, as is reflected in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR]. The article concludes by proposing a uniform and consistent regime for limiting freedom of expression in an era of mass exposure of personal data to harmful online dissemination on the global Internet of Things [IoT].

This article aims to analyse how constitutional courts make use of advisory opinions of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). Despite that national constitutional courts significantly engage with the advisory work of the Venice Commission, the causes and effects of this engagement remain less explored in constitutional law scholarship. In order to address this gap, this article, from a macro perspective, examines the case law in which the Venice Commission is referred to by constitutional courts, drawn from the Venice Commission’s constitutional adjudication database (CODICES). In addition, appropriate data from the case law of the Constitutional Court of Turkey is examined in particular to expand the scope of the research through micro lens. The article argues that constitutional advice has some advantages for constitutional judges given that it provides a strategic tool for determining reasoning. Despite its non-binding nature, the Venice Commission’s constitutional advice is occasionally considered by constitutional courts, depending on the strategic preferences of the courts, and the judges in a given jurisdiction.

The paper aims to analyse several theoretical problems concerning the recognition of the right to conscientious objection to compulsory vaccination. Our interest in the matter has stemmed from our domestic experience in the Czech Republic, ie a country with a traditional, comprehensive system of compulsory vaccination, but also a country in which the Constitutional Court recognised that, under certain conditions, conscientious objections to compulsory vaccination may be successfully invoked. The Constitutional Court created a special four-prong test for public authorities to ascertain whether the conscientious objection is legitimate to the case at hand and compulsory vaccination should not be enforced. We believe that sharing the Czech experience and pinpointing its crucial, but also debatable, aspects (especially the legal basis for the recognition of conscientious objection and the test itself) may be a useful comparative material for other states with a system of compulsory vaccination, or states which contemplate its introduction, possibly even against Covid-19. However, to add a broader European perspective, the paper will also examine the context of the relationship between compulsory vaccination and conscientious objection in the light of the Convention and will analyse the relevant case-law of the Strasbourg Court. A definitive answer as to whether a conscientious objection to compulsory vaccination may entail the protection of Article 9 of the Convention has not yet been given by the Strasbourg Court. Nevertheless, we argue that the case-law indicates that, under certain conditions, conscientious objections could attract the guarantees of Article 9 in future cases.