Volume 16, Issue 4

Among certain politicians, pundits and people, the expectation was that President Trump would make an economic difference in the 2018 congressional elections. In particular, the belief was that his economic appeal, coupled with his economic policies, would favor Republican candidates. However, an application of the classic referendum model for forecasting congressional outcomes shows no detectable Trump economic effect. That is, the economic conditions prevailing prior to the election, measured in multiple ways, worked as usual, helping to predict the actual Republican 40 seat loss rather closely. Put another way, any incumbent administration, faced with this set of numbers, would likely have experienced the same outcome. In sum, the Trump presence, in its economic manifestations, did not positively impact the Republican party fortune at midterm time.

At bottom, the election of 2018 produced one more iteration of an electoral order dominating American politics since 1992. So the main task of this paper is to elicit the structure of that order, drop the results of 2018 into it, and see how well those results fit. The key micro-analytic tools for approaching any election did work well in 2018, but cannot distinguish this election from other recent contests. The common journalistic focus on idiosyncratic elements of stability but especially change provides no real means of analyzing either. With the result that a focus on the structure of the modern American political world has to provide the tools for unpacking what proves to be an impressively stable electoral pattern.

Why did the American electorate elect a solid majority of Republicans to the House in 2016 and then 2 years later replace it with a solid majority of Democrats? This article revives the idea of an electoral mandate and applies it to the 2016 and 2018 elections. It proposes a trinity of partisan attitudes serving as the components of electoral mandates: performance, values, and leadership. The election of President Trump in 2016 depended on a mix of performance evaluations (a weak economy) favoring the Republicans and leadership evaluations (Trump’s behavior difficulties) muted by value considerations (conservative anger at being unrepresented and the necessity of a choice between Trump and Clinton). These offsetting partisan attitudes made the election close enough that a small number of votes in key states decided the electoral vote outcome. In 2018, performance evaluations again favored Republicans, but now because they presided over a stronger economy. Evaluations of Trump’s leadership remained negative. The interaction of values with these leadership assessments now favored Democrats. As the out-party, polarized liberals were motivated by anti-Trump anger. Never-Trump conservatives who had drifted back to vote Republican at the end of the 2016 campaign did not feel that same pressure without the presidency being at stake. About two-thirds of voters in 2018 said their vote was about Trump. Republicans lost to Democrats among these voters by 16 percentage points. Republicans delivered on their 2016 mandate to boost the economy, but had failed to provide leadership that many Americans could feel comfortable with.

The 2018 midterm elections resulted in record levels of turnout, campaign funding, and the representation of women and minorities in Congress. Moreover, Democrats regained control of the US House of Representatives while Republicans shored up their minimal majority in the Senate. What made such a historic outcome possible? This article examines the candidates, expectations, outcomes, and implications of the 2018 midterm elections. In doing so, it offers an analysis into the primary elections, suggesting that the 2018 midterm results in the House were largely a result of successful nominations of quality Democratic candidates who were able to capitalize on the unpopularity of President Donald Trump despite an otherwise strong national economy. It closes with an in-depth analysis into the implications of the 2018 midterm election on both the incoming 116th Congress as well as the upcoming 2020 Presidential election.

The 2018 elections marked a notable increase in the influence of ideological media over both major American parties. Conservative media sources, led by Fox News Channel, further solidified their power within the Republican Party, maintaining their traditional role of informing and mobilizing Republican voters while extending their reach to become densely integrated with Republican elites, especially President Trump. At the same time, deep antipathy to the Trump presidency among Democratic voters produced a surge in popular demand for overtly liberal media programming and information about the 2018 elections, leading to extensive citizen engagement (especially online) and record grassroots fundraising totals for Democratic candidates. The events of 2018 thus furthered two important long-term trends – the ideological polarization of the parties and the nationalization of American elections – that continue to define our contemporary political era.

Throughout the 2016 US presidential campaign and the first 2 years of his presidency, Donald Trump has repeatedly dehumanized immigrants in pursuit of more restrictive immigration policies. Despite the common perception that this threat should increase the political mobilization of Latino voters, existing research has yielded mixed findings. In this article, we argue that attention has to be paid to both threatening climate and mobilization. We examine Latino voting in the 2018 midterm election using both aggregate election data from 2014 and 2018 as well as a large 10-week tracking poll (n=2767) of Latinos during the last 2 months of the 2018 election. We show that, compared to 2014, the number of ballots cast by Latinos increased substantially. Using the tracking poll, however, we show that threat alone did not appear to be sufficient to mobilize Latino voters in the 2018 election. It is threat combined with mobilization, rather, that increased Latino voting. We discuss implications for future Latino political participation in the US.

This paper examines the role of authoritarianism in the 2018 US congressional elections. In particular, we assess whether the issues that have historically been central to the authoritarian divide in the American electorate were salient in the campaigns of several important Senate races. We demonstrate that authoritarian attitudes played a consistent, significant role on presidential vote choice, party identification, and numerous policy areas in the 2016 presidential election using data from the American National Election Studies. Using case studies of six Senate races in the 2018 midterm elections, we find that authoritarianism was more muted than in 2016, and that the role of authoritarianism varied considerably depending upon the race. States with stronger Trump support in 2016 featured authoritarianism more heavily than states with less Trump support in 2016, but authoritarianism overall was not as prominent in 2018 as in 2016. Overall, Senate candidates relied on traditional campaign messages related to candidate qualifications, personal attacks, the economy, and other messages less central to authoritarianism.

Many speculated that we would observe a gender gap in vote choice of historic proportions in the 2018 midterm elections. However, the 2018 gender gap was similar to gender gaps in previous elections. I argue that the gender gap is not about a specific candidate or election but is driven by gender differences in partisan attachments. Variation in the gender gap in Senate and gubernatorial elections highlight that the gender gap does not advantage a particular candidate or party and that women candidates do not increase the size of the gender gap. Race and class intersect with gender to shape the partisan attachments and vote choice of men and women. Finally, while the candidates and events surrounding the 2018 election likely did not impact the gender gap in 2018, I discuss how the 2018 election will shape the gender gap in future elections.

The 2018 House midterm elections saw Democrats regain a majority in the chamber for the first time in almost a decade. Contributing to this partisan change was the difficult situation Republican House incumbents were subject to. This article will examine the different factors contributing to the Republicans’ loss including the role of ideology in candidate success in both the primary and general election stage, the effects of retirements and open seats, and the value of presidential endorsements and legislative position taking.

From the moment Donald Trump took the oath of office, women’s political engagement skyrocketed. This groundswell of activism almost immediately led to widespread reporting that Trump’s victory was inspiring a large new crop of female candidates across the country. We rely on a May 2017 national survey of “potential candidates” and the 2018 midterm election results to assess whether this “Trump Effect” materialized. Our analysis uncovers some evidence for it. Democrats – especially women – held very negative feelings toward Trump, and those feelings generated heightened political interest and activity during the 2018 election cycle. That activism, however, was not accompanied by a broad scale surge in women’s interest in running for office. In fact, the overall gender gap in political ambition today is quite similar to the gap we’ve uncovered throughout the last 20 years. Notably, though, about one quarter of the Democratic women who expressed interest in running for office first started thinking about it only after Trump was elected. That relatively small group of newly interested candidates was sufficient to result in a record number of Democratic women seeking and winning election to Congress. With no commensurate increase in Republican women’s political engagement or candidate emergence, however, prospects for gender parity in US political institutions remain bleak.