Volume 68, Issue 3

After briefly noting key contemporary critiques of aesthetic experience, this article revisits its original account in Plato’s theory of aesthetic experience as the madness of divine possession and then Aristotle’s response of defending art’s rationality as poiesis , which largely dominates the ensuing aesthetic tradition. I subsequently explore how the mysterious notion of possession continues to surface in important modern accounts of aesthetic experience (e. g. in Theodor W. Adorno, T. S. Eliot, John Dewey) and explain how the supernatural idea of possession could find a naturalistic explanation that integrates the concepts of artworld, habitus and atmosphere. The article then exemplifies this naturalistic explanation through an analysis of the possession experience pertaining to performance art as documented in The Adventures of the Man in Gold .

This paper “on the logics of language” discusses the fundamental role which the reality of language plays in the thinking of Hölderlin as well as in Hegel. Common to both is the emphasis on the ‘Wirklichkeit der Sprache’ – in the double sense of this phrase: the reality language is, and the reality language has. At the same time there is, of course, the great difference that for Hegel the logic of language fulfils itself in the ‘work of the concept(s)’ [“Arbeit des Begriffs”], while for Hölderlin it is fulfilled in forms of poetry or in the broader sense of poetic work. The paper explores the origins, conceptual basics and consequences of the dialectic between moving ‘from language to logics’ in Hegel and moving ‘from logics to language’ in Hölderlin. The main works of Hegel considered here are Die Phänomenologie des Geistes , Wissenschaft der Logik and some parts of the Enzyklopädie (1830); from Hölderlin the focus is on the theoretical fragments Seyn, Urtheil, … , Das untergehende Vaterland … and Wenn der Dichter einmal des Geistes mächtig ist … . One central issue treated by exploring the discussion between Hegel and Hölderlin is their respective concepts of memory and its development. Reflecting on the connection between the power of imagination and the necessity of forms of utterance is the other. The primary aim of the paper is to explain the relevance that Hölderlin’s poetic work has in philosophical perspective – a relevance which can be explained in relation to Hegel.

Hegel’s approach to ancient scepticism is often discussed only in the context of epistemological questions. But it is also of crucial importance for his practical philosophy. Hegel draws on central figures of Pyrrhonian scepticism in order to subject Kant’s antinomies – i. e., Kant’s cosmology – to a fundamental revision. He radicalises Kant’s sceptical method to “self-completing scepticism”. At the same time he gives Kant’s concept of the world a practical twist: In Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit , world means an inhabited sphere in which powers and counter-powers are in conflict with each other. In doing so, he opens up the tradition of negativist thinking in political philosophy, which ranges from Marx and Adorno to the current theories of radical democracy. When Hegel calls Pyrrhonian skepticism a “negative dialectic”, he thereby marks what he views as a deficit: the inferiority of Pyrrhonian skepticism to speculative philosophy. However, it is precisely the practical dimension of Hegel’s dialectic that suggests that the sceptical motives of his thinking should be given great weight. This can be seen most clearly in Hegel’s concept of Bildung , which defines emancipation processes as the reactivation of open power relations in static conditions of domination.

This essay deals with the terms “form” and “function” as well as their relationship insofar as they are still used in philosophical and design-theory discourse to determine the aesthetic dimension of designed artefacts, especially of everyday objects, and often also to distinguish them from objects of art. I discuss whether our common understanding of these terms and their relationship is an appropriate instrument for such determinations. What is up for discussion here are not only conceptions of functional beauty with regard to design methodology and the philosophical discourse on aesthetics, in which form and function become thematic, but also basic concepts of philosophical aesthetics itself. It is shown that the philosophical understanding of design aesthetics and the concepts of form and function are determined by profound preliminary decisions that restrict our access to the aesthetic dimension of designed artefacts, and a conceptualisation of an initial change in thinking is proposed.

The paper proposes a morphological approach towards a philosophy of design. Beginning with the question: what is “Gestalt”? it argues that there is a crucial difference between the concepts of “Gestalt” and “form”. I will proceed in three steps, beginning with the Aristotelian doctrine of the four causes and its implications for the concept of nature. Secondly I will briefly discuss Goethe’s notion of “Gestalt” within his “Morphologie” and how it was used among his successors (including the “Bauhaus”), which leads straight into contemporary debates about computational design. Finally, and in conclusion, I introduce a morpho-logical “Gestalt”-thinking as a distinct and original kind of design-philosophy, beyond common design-history, or mere design-thinking.

In the process of making bedsteads, Plato claimed, makers look towards the ‘idea’ of the bed. But what is that idea? Two candidates come to mind: shape and purpose. The fact that we identify objects of very different shape, not even involving a bedstead, as beds seems to render purpose conceptually superior. But, then, what is a bed’s purpose? An obvious response appears tobe: lying down and sleeping. Yet, first, beds are not needed for that. Secondly, precisely when a bed is slept on, it is not perceived as a design object. Thirdly, beds constitute a kind of existential furniture, associated with giving birth, making love, suffering illness and dying. All such issues humans really care about, however, are strikingly indifferent towards the design of beds. As elsewhere, the maxim that form follows function fails. Design thinking might rather make headway when beds are conceived of as peculiar spaces within spaces.

The essay begins with some historical considerations on design, philosophy and science. The subsequent reflections focus on the quasi-metaphysical prerequisites of the conditions under which design objects and design processes are produced and received. It is a question of the relationships that can be reconstructed – in the context of nature’s subjugation, work, and social interaction – between purposes of use and external and internal determination of form. Under the social conditions of the capitalist economy, design casts things, nature and people into commodity form. This makes it possible to communicate them and to communicate with them. And by doing this in an aesthetic way, design produces at the same time images or representations of things, nature and people beyond their commodity form. In the sphere of the aesthetic appearance of objects and processes, their functionalisation is exceeded. The aesthetic paradigm shift from the primacy of the form of the design object to the primacy of the social function of aesthetic practice – introduced by Walter Benjamin’s media aesthetics – is actualised in a contradictory fashion in contemporary high-tech communication.