Volume 11, Issue 3

Accounting and management practice as well as accounting research would benefit by shifting more of the scholarly attention towards external matters – solving problems of practice – while retaining its emphasis on rigor and validity of research claims.

Infection, hospitalization and mortality statistics have played a pivotal role in forming social attitudes and support for policy decisions about the 2020-21 SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) pandemic. This article raises some questions on some of the most widely-used indicators, such as the case fatality rate, derived from these statistics, recommending replacing them with information based on regular stratified statistical sampling, coupled with diagnostic assessment. Some implications for public health policies and pandemic management are developed, opposing individualistic and holistic approaches.

Modern, globalised financial markets are the offspring of a process of liberalisation of capital that started with the collapse of Bretton Woods in the 1970s and culminated with a number of regulatory changes in the 1980s and 1990s. As a consequence of that process, financial markets have grown dramatically and become increasingly integrated at a global level. Importantly, the growth and innovation that occurred over the past decade has taken place in the realm of capital market finance, and in particular in the context of market-based channels that revolved chiefly around securitisation and repo transactions. As a result, new debt transactions and products have been engineered since the 1980s. This article contends that, contrary to conventional belief, the excessive development of market-based channels of finance has been one of the catalysts behind the crises and scandals exploded over the past fifteen years. In particular, the employment of innovative debt transactions was instrumental to the creation of excessive levels of risk-taking and leverage. These had catastrophic consequence, both at firm level and at systemic level. Notwithstanding the regulatory measures that have been enacted over the past fifteen years, the way in which debt transactions in capital markets are designed and entered into remains lightly or indirectly regulated. Moreover, regulators have so far neglected the role that leverage and debt creation have in the economy and the consequence that these phenomena have on the wider social context. On the contrary, recently the EU has promoted the implementation of an old design, namely the Capital Markets Union (CMU). This revolves around market-based forms of financing, which should represent an alternative to the traditionally predominant (in Europe) bank-based financing channels. This article contends that the CMU framework fails to appreciate the dangers associated with capital markets finance and its ensuing debt creation effects. It argues that, despite some regulatory efforts, a suitable architecture for the regulation of market-based channels of finance is still missing.

Determining the appropriate tax rate for the wealthiest citizens is a topic of much debate in the political, social, and economic spheres. Opinions vary considerably. Arguably, accounting and economics are the two collegiate majors of study where the theory of taxation and tax law are most often discussed. Due to higher focus on the topic, students graduating with accounting or economics degrees may have differing views of taxation compared to other graduates. An understanding of these differences has potential implications for policy, pedagogy, and the professions of accounting and economics. Using longitudinal survey data on students from 619 American colleges and universities, the differences in opinions on taxing the wealthy for accounting and economics majors, compared to others, are examined. Accounting and economics majors are found to both begin and end their collegiate tenure with statistically different tax opinions than other majors. Evidence is uncovered that, on average, both programs of study make students somewhat less likely to favor a policy which would increase the taxes paid by the wealthy. Within accounting education, opinion change is more prominent for students from high-earning families, males, non-minorities, and at right-leaning institutions, while the estimated impact of economics education is relatively universal.

This paper explains the functioning of economic crowdfunding (equity- and loan-based). One of the angles from which crowdfunding can be analysed is institutional economics. Namely, it can be studied as a case where the spontaneous evolution of contractual forms is difficult and the need for legislative intervention arises. The paper explains the divergence of interests and risks of three groups of agents involved (platforms, fundraisers and funders). The radical asymmetry of power, to the advantage of the platform, is inherent in this type of business. The spontaneous development of strategies by the platforms (pricing and some non-price strategies relating to fundraisers) and recent developments in the direction of automatic decisions taken by the platform instead of funders, promotes the development of the crowdfunding business, but it does not ensure protection from risk of other parties. Still, the major source of risk for funders and partly also for fundraisers is the absence of liability of the platforms themselves. In these conditions, the spontaneous move towards the better alignment of the interests of parties seems unfeasible and external regulation is necessary.