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Research on the Loss Sharing Contract in Supply Chain Under Asymmetric Information

  • Jinling Sun , Peiyu Zhu EMAIL logo , Shumo Jin and Hongbin Wang
Published/Copyright: May 31, 2019
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Abstract

In this study, the coordination contract of internal and external losses of supply chain under asymmetric information is studied. Firstly, the profit functions of supplier and manufacturer are established respectively. Secondly, the contract under unilateral and bilateral moral hazard is designed. Finally, a numerical example is given to analyze the coordination contract. It is proved that the overall coordination of supply chain can be achieved through loss sharing contract, and the quality level and overall profit can be improved.


Supported by Philosophy and Social Sciences Fundation of Gansu, China (YB063); Soft Science Project of Gansu (18CX1ZA0014); Science and Technology Project Plan of Constructions of Urban and Rural Housing Construction of Gansu, China (JK2018-19); Scientific Research Projects of Universities in Gansu (055007)


Acknowledgements

The authors gratefully acknowledge the editor and anonymous referees for their insightful comments and helpful suggestions that led to a marked improvement of the article.

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Received: 2018-09-06
Accepted: 2018-11-13
Published Online: 2019-05-31

© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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