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Middlemen in the Shapley-Shubik Competitive Markets for Indivisible Goods
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Takayuki Oishi
Published/Copyright:
May 9, 2014
Abstract
We generalize the Shapley-Shubik market model for indivisible goods by considering the case where agents need middlemen to exchange their indivisible goods. In this model, there always exist competitive equilibria in which transaction takes place directly between sellers and buyers or indirectly through the middlemen. Furthermore, the incentives of middlemen to enter the market exist. We derive these results from the existence of an integral solution for a partitioning linear program.
Published Online: 2014-5-9
Published in Print: 2014-8-30
©2014 Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston
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