Home Kant's Non-Absolutist Conception of Political Legitimacy – How Public Right ‘Concludes’ Private Right in the “Doctrine of Right”
Article
Licensed
Unlicensed Requires Authentication

Kant's Non-Absolutist Conception of Political Legitimacy – How Public Right ‘Concludes’ Private Right in the “Doctrine of Right”

  • Helga Varden
Published/Copyright: January 24, 2011
Become an author with De Gruyter Brill
Kant-Studien
From the journal Volume 101 Issue 3

Abstract

Contrary to the received view, I argue that Kant, in the “Doctrine of Right”, outlines a third, republican alternative to absolutist and voluntarist conceptions of political legitimacy. According to this republican alternative, a state must meet certain institutional requirements before political obligations arise. An important result of this interpretation is not only that there are institutional restraints on a legitimate state's use of coercion, but also that the rights of the state (‘public right’) are not in principle reducible to the rights of individuals (‘private right’). Thus, for Kant, political obligations are intimately linked to the existence of a certain kind of republican institutional framework.

Published Online: 2011-01-24
Published in Print: 2010-October

© Walter de Gruyter 2010

Downloaded on 14.10.2025 from https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/kant.2010.021/html
Scroll to top button