Umfangslogik und analytisches Urteil bei Kant
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Rico Hauswald
Abstract
According to Kant's most important definition an analytic judgement obtains when the predicate of a judgement is already contained intensionally in the subject. It has been objected (most recently by Robert Hanna) that whereas this containment is a sufficient criterion, nevertheless there are analytic judgements that do not have a corresponding conceptual content. In these cases one needs to add an extensional criterion. The chief goal of this essay is to examine this argument critically and to reject it on the grounds that although an analytic judgement can be defined extensionally, this does not achieve anything more than a conventional intensional definition. To this end Kant's argumentation on intension and extension will be reconstructed and this distinction will then be set in relation to the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. This discussion requires especially a clarification of the role of modality.
© Walter de Gruyter 2010
Articles in the same Issue
- Umfangslogik und analytisches Urteil bei Kant
- Kant on Sex and Marriage: The Implications for the Same-Sex Marriage Debate
- Kant's Non-Absolutist Conception of Political Legitimacy – How Public Right ‘Concludes’ Private Right in the “Doctrine of Right”
- Logische und grammatische Form in der Prädikatenlogik – Anmerkungen zu einem „Gedanken“ Axel Bühlers
- Zwei Konjekturvorschläge zur Tugendlehre, § 9
- Noch einmal zu Kants Rechtsbegründung
- Buchbesprechungen
Articles in the same Issue
- Umfangslogik und analytisches Urteil bei Kant
- Kant on Sex and Marriage: The Implications for the Same-Sex Marriage Debate
- Kant's Non-Absolutist Conception of Political Legitimacy – How Public Right ‘Concludes’ Private Right in the “Doctrine of Right”
- Logische und grammatische Form in der Prädikatenlogik – Anmerkungen zu einem „Gedanken“ Axel Bühlers
- Zwei Konjekturvorschläge zur Tugendlehre, § 9
- Noch einmal zu Kants Rechtsbegründung
- Buchbesprechungen
