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Judicial Review (Departmentalism) vs Supremacy: The Connection to a 17th Century Debate and a Dilemma for Today

  • Boleslaw Z Kabala ORCID logo EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: June 8, 2020

Abstract

Proponents of judicial supremacy argue that the interpretation of the Constitution by the Supreme Court is authoritative for the two other branches of government, while advocates of judicial review (or departmentalism) argue that authority to interpret the Constitution resides in each branch. Both sides offer historical examples in which their understanding prevailed. How to resolve this impasse? I argue that Hobbes and Spinoza can inform the debate. To do so, I first unpack the terms: what is the difference between judicial review or departmentalism and judicial supremacy? I then show that a renowned legal scholar, Larry Alexander, specifically invokes Hobbes in defense of judicial supremacy. For Alexander, the Supreme Court functions as a Hobbesian sovereign. Spinoza presents a clear alternative to the Hobbesian solution of avoiding a state of nature by concentrating power in a unitary sovereign, namely, via a strategy of diffusing power throughout society. But Spinoza’s solution is not yet a formal separation of powers. This conception of power can therefore clarify the assumptions made by advocates of both judicial review or departmentalism and judicial supremacy. I close by considering instances in American history when the application of departmentalist logic did not lead to a Hobbesian state of nature. And what are the lessons for today? I suggest that it is perhaps time to consider an analog to the Canadian/Israeli notwithstanding clause. But rather than adopting verbatim their legislative override, which effectively designates the legislative branch to be supreme, we could require two of the three independent and equal branches to decide contended constitutional questions. Such an American notwithstanding clause would respect the design of our federal government.


Corresponding author: Boleslaw Z Kabala, Department of Government, Legal Studies, and Philosophy, Tarleton State University, O A Grant Bldg 349, 1333 W Washington St, Stephenville, TX, 76402, USA, E-mail:

Research Conducted at: James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions, Princeton University, Bobst Hall 203, 83 Prospect Avenue, Princeton, NJ 08540.


Acknowledgment

I would like to acknowledge the James Madison Program at Princeton University and its unique and stimulating intellectual milieu and thank Professor Robert George for sustaining it. An earlier version of this work was presented at the Lunch Seminar in Political Science at Princeton University on 29 May 2018. I am grateful to the participants for their input. For their helpful ideas on judicial review (departmentalism) as well as comments on the paper I would like to thank Matthew J Franck, Mark Movsesian, Michael Stokes Paulsen, Greg Forster, John Janney, Matthew Slaboch, and Deborah O’Malley. Finally, I acknowledge my anonymous Reviewers and Editors-in-Chief for their careful reading of the manuscript and their helpful comments and suggestions, which helped improve the paper and make it more readable.

  1. Competing interests: The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Published Online: 2020-06-08
Published in Print: 2020-06-25

© 2020 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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