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When Less Means More: Policy Accumulation, Administrative Capacities, and Policy Performance

  • Xavier Fernández-i-Marín , Markus Hinterleitner , Christoph Knill ORCID logo EMAIL logo and Yves Steinebach
Published/Copyright: February 6, 2025
The Economists’ Voice
From the journal The Economists’ Voice Volume 22 Issue 1

Abstract

Democratic governments have consistently introduced new policies to address various societal, economic, and environmental issues. However, this ongoing expansion of policy measures risks overburdening the public administrations responsible for their execution. To explore this challenge, we examine how the relationship between the size of sectoral policy portfolios and available implementation capacities impacts the effectiveness of sectoral policies. Our analysis of environmental policies across OECD countries reveals a growing disparity between the number of policies requiring implementation and the resources available to carry them out, which in turn negatively affects policy performance.

Keywords: policy accumulation; bureeaucratic overload; policy performance
JEL Classification: H11
Corresponding author: Christoph Knill, Political Science, LMU Munich, Munich, Germany, E-mail:

Funding source: European Research Council

Award Identifier / Grant number: Advanced Grant 101141549

Award Identifier / Grant number: Advanced Grant 788941

Award Identifier / Grant number: European Research Council

References

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Received: 2025-01-23
Accepted: 2025-01-24
Published Online: 2025-02-06

© 2025 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Frontmatter
  2. Editorial
  3. Editorial: Bureaucracy, Regulation and Deregulation
  4. Policy Papers (No Special Focus)
  5. Using Market Design to Reform the US Electoral College
  6. Financial Stability and Monetary Policy Autonomy in Japan. Should Japan Peg the Yen to the Dollar?
  7. The Present Monetary Policy Framework is Seriously Flawed
  8. On the Reform of Fiscal Rules in the European Union: What Has Been Achieved, and How Did We Get Here?
  9. Efficacy of Economic Sanctions on Imposing Costs to State-Owned Enterprises: The Case of Iran
  10. Policy Forum: Bureaucracy, Regulation and Deregulation
  11. “The Report of My Death was an Exaggeration”: Business Dynamism in the United States
  12. Balancing Power: The Impact of Legislative Structure on Sunset Laws and Administrative Procedure Acts
  13. When Less Means More: Policy Accumulation, Administrative Capacities, and Policy Performance
  14. Lost Economic Output due to High Bureaucratic Burden: The Case for Germany
  15. Regulation and Income Mobility
  16. A 3D Look at Argentina: Deregulation, Dollarization, Deflation
  17. Taxonomy Disclosure in the EU – A Useful Framework, Despite Current Challenges
  18. Comment on “EU Taxonomy: Mission Impossible” by Kooths (2023)
  19. Reply to Comment on “EU Taxonomy: Mission Impossible”
https://doi.org/10.1515/ev-2025-0003
Keywords for this article
policy accumulation; bureeaucratic overload; policy performance

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Frontmatter
  2. Editorial
  3. Editorial: Bureaucracy, Regulation and Deregulation
  4. Policy Papers (No Special Focus)
  5. Using Market Design to Reform the US Electoral College
  6. Financial Stability and Monetary Policy Autonomy in Japan. Should Japan Peg the Yen to the Dollar?
  7. The Present Monetary Policy Framework is Seriously Flawed
  8. On the Reform of Fiscal Rules in the European Union: What Has Been Achieved, and How Did We Get Here?
  9. Efficacy of Economic Sanctions on Imposing Costs to State-Owned Enterprises: The Case of Iran
  10. Policy Forum: Bureaucracy, Regulation and Deregulation
  11. “The Report of My Death was an Exaggeration”: Business Dynamism in the United States
  12. Balancing Power: The Impact of Legislative Structure on Sunset Laws and Administrative Procedure Acts
  13. When Less Means More: Policy Accumulation, Administrative Capacities, and Policy Performance
  14. Lost Economic Output due to High Bureaucratic Burden: The Case for Germany
  15. Regulation and Income Mobility
  16. A 3D Look at Argentina: Deregulation, Dollarization, Deflation
  17. Taxonomy Disclosure in the EU – A Useful Framework, Despite Current Challenges
  18. Comment on “EU Taxonomy: Mission Impossible” by Kooths (2023)
  19. Reply to Comment on “EU Taxonomy: Mission Impossible”
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