Respect as an Object of Equal Distribution? Opacity, Individual Recognition and Second-Personal Authority
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Elena Irrera
Abstract
In this paper I pursue the possibility of addressing respect not only in terms of a theoretical support for the articulation of distributive policies, but also and especially as an object itself of equal distribution. I work out a specific model of “respectful treatment” of minority subjects which, if displayed by institutions and their representatives, may prove well-suited to (i) handle claims of recognition related to certain aspects of the identity of those who are issuing the request (e. g. linguistic, ethnic, religious, cultural); (ii) acknowledge the moral authority of the subjects who have advanced such claims. With a view to this, I critically engage with two normative models of equal respect for people: (1) Carter’s idea of “opacity respect”, which is premised on the idea that respecting people requires treating them as endowed with a minimum threshold of empirical agential capacities; (2) Galeotti’s paradigm of equal respect as an individualising act of recognition.
Abstract
In this paper I pursue the possibility of addressing respect not only in terms of a theoretical support for the articulation of distributive policies, but also and especially as an object itself of equal distribution. I work out a specific model of “respectful treatment” of minority subjects which, if displayed by institutions and their representatives, may prove well-suited to (i) handle claims of recognition related to certain aspects of the identity of those who are issuing the request (e. g. linguistic, ethnic, religious, cultural); (ii) acknowledge the moral authority of the subjects who have advanced such claims. With a view to this, I critically engage with two normative models of equal respect for people: (1) Carter’s idea of “opacity respect”, which is premised on the idea that respecting people requires treating them as endowed with a minimum threshold of empirical agential capacities; (2) Galeotti’s paradigm of equal respect as an individualising act of recognition.
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- List of Abbreviations IX
- Introduction: Two Opposing Conceptions of Distributive Justice 1
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Part I: Deep Disagreements
- Deep Disagreements on Social and Political Justice: Their Meta-Ethical Relevance and the Need for a New Research Perspective 23
- Are There Irreconcilable Conceptions of Justice? Critical Remarks on Isaiah Berlin 53
- Equality beyond Liberal Egalitarianism: Walzer’s Contribution to the Theory of Justice 71
- Stuart Hampshire and the Case for Procedural Justice 91
- Public Reason in Circumstances of Pluralism 109
- Does Rawls’s First Principle of Justice Allow for Consensus? A Note 127
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Part II: Ancient Perspectives and Critiques of the Centrality of Justice
- Aristotle on Natural Right 133
- What Is “Just in Distribution” in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Politics – Too Much Justice, Too Little Right 151
- Justice in Ethics and Political Philosophy: A Fundamental Critique 171
- Justicitis 187
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Part III: The Problem of Consensus
- Rawls on Overlapping Disagreement and the Problem of Reconciliation 207
- Public Reason, Compromise within Consensus, and Legitimacy 225
- From Consensus to Modus Vivendi? Pluralistic Approaches to the Challenge of Moral Diversity and Conflict 243
- What Bonds Citizens in a Pluralistic Democracy? Probing Mouffe’s Notion of a Conflictual Consensus 259
- Citizenship, Community, and the Rule of Law: With or Without Consensus? 275
- Political Liberalism: The Burdens of Judgement and Moral Psychology 291
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Part IV: Expanding the Perspective on Obligations
- John Rawls and Claims of Climate Justice: Tensions and Prospects 311
- Assistance, Emergency Relief and the Duty Not to Harm – Rawls’ and Cosmopolitan Approaches to Distributive Justice Combined 329
- Global Collective Obligations, Just International Institutions and Pluralism 345
- Intergenerational Justice in the Age of Genetic Manipulation 361
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Part V: Diversifying the Perspective
- The Contours of Toleration: A Relational Account 385
- Constructing Public Distributive Justice: On the Method of Functionalist Moral Theory 403
- Respect as an Object of Equal Distribution? Opacity, Individual Recognition and Second-Personal Authority 423
- Responsibility and Justice: Beyond Moral Egalitarianism and Rational Consensus 441
- Habermas’s and Rawls’s Postsecular Modesty 449
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Part VI: The Difference Principle
- A Defense of the Difference Principle beyond Rawls 469
- Marxist Critiques of the Difference Principle 487
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Part VII: The Economic Perspective: Adam Smith
- Justice, Equity, and Distribution: Adam Smith’s Answer to John Rawls’s Difference Principle 505
- Statism and Distributive Injustice in Adam Smith 523
- Notes on Contributors 541
- Author Index 545
- Subject Index 551
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- List of Abbreviations IX
- Introduction: Two Opposing Conceptions of Distributive Justice 1
-
Part I: Deep Disagreements
- Deep Disagreements on Social and Political Justice: Their Meta-Ethical Relevance and the Need for a New Research Perspective 23
- Are There Irreconcilable Conceptions of Justice? Critical Remarks on Isaiah Berlin 53
- Equality beyond Liberal Egalitarianism: Walzer’s Contribution to the Theory of Justice 71
- Stuart Hampshire and the Case for Procedural Justice 91
- Public Reason in Circumstances of Pluralism 109
- Does Rawls’s First Principle of Justice Allow for Consensus? A Note 127
-
Part II: Ancient Perspectives and Critiques of the Centrality of Justice
- Aristotle on Natural Right 133
- What Is “Just in Distribution” in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Politics – Too Much Justice, Too Little Right 151
- Justice in Ethics and Political Philosophy: A Fundamental Critique 171
- Justicitis 187
-
Part III: The Problem of Consensus
- Rawls on Overlapping Disagreement and the Problem of Reconciliation 207
- Public Reason, Compromise within Consensus, and Legitimacy 225
- From Consensus to Modus Vivendi? Pluralistic Approaches to the Challenge of Moral Diversity and Conflict 243
- What Bonds Citizens in a Pluralistic Democracy? Probing Mouffe’s Notion of a Conflictual Consensus 259
- Citizenship, Community, and the Rule of Law: With or Without Consensus? 275
- Political Liberalism: The Burdens of Judgement and Moral Psychology 291
-
Part IV: Expanding the Perspective on Obligations
- John Rawls and Claims of Climate Justice: Tensions and Prospects 311
- Assistance, Emergency Relief and the Duty Not to Harm – Rawls’ and Cosmopolitan Approaches to Distributive Justice Combined 329
- Global Collective Obligations, Just International Institutions and Pluralism 345
- Intergenerational Justice in the Age of Genetic Manipulation 361
-
Part V: Diversifying the Perspective
- The Contours of Toleration: A Relational Account 385
- Constructing Public Distributive Justice: On the Method of Functionalist Moral Theory 403
- Respect as an Object of Equal Distribution? Opacity, Individual Recognition and Second-Personal Authority 423
- Responsibility and Justice: Beyond Moral Egalitarianism and Rational Consensus 441
- Habermas’s and Rawls’s Postsecular Modesty 449
-
Part VI: The Difference Principle
- A Defense of the Difference Principle beyond Rawls 469
- Marxist Critiques of the Difference Principle 487
-
Part VII: The Economic Perspective: Adam Smith
- Justice, Equity, and Distribution: Adam Smith’s Answer to John Rawls’s Difference Principle 505
- Statism and Distributive Injustice in Adam Smith 523
- Notes on Contributors 541
- Author Index 545
- Subject Index 551
