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Published/Copyright: August 13, 2012

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"Introduction" Theoretical Inquiries in Law, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. i-iv. https://doi.org/10.1515/1565-3404.1297

(). Introduction. Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 13(2), i-iv. https://doi.org/10.1515/1565-3404.1297

() Introduction. Theoretical Inquiries in Law, Vol. 13 (Issue 2), pp. i-iv. https://doi.org/10.1515/1565-3404.1297

"Introduction" Theoretical Inquiries in Law 13, no. 2 (): i-iv. https://doi.org/10.1515/1565-3404.1297

Introduction. Theoretical Inquiries in Law. ;13(2): i-iv. https://doi.org/10.1515/1565-3404.1297

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Published Online: 2012-8-13

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Introduction
Governments as Investors of Last Resort: Comparative Credit Crisis Case-Studies
Bank Nationalizations of the 1930s in Italy: The IRI Formula
Crowding Theory and Executive Compensation
Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines: The Case of Japan
Corporate Governance under State Control: The Chinese Experience
The Unintended Consequences of State Ownership: The Brazilian Experience
Can Company Disclosures Discipline State-Appointed Managers? Evidence from Greek Privatizations
Hidden Government Influence over Privatized Banks
State Intervention in Corporate Governance: National Interest and Board Composition
Hidden Costs of Mandatory Long-Term Compensation
Global Investment Regulation and Sovereign Funds

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Article
Introduction
Governments as Investors of Last Resort: Comparative Credit Crisis Case-Studies
Bank Nationalizations of the 1930s in Italy: The IRI Formula
Crowding Theory and Executive Compensation
Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines: The Case of Japan
Corporate Governance under State Control: The Chinese Experience
The Unintended Consequences of State Ownership: The Brazilian Experience
Can Company Disclosures Discipline State-Appointed Managers? Evidence from Greek Privatizations
Hidden Government Influence over Privatized Banks
State Intervention in Corporate Governance: National Interest and Board Composition
Hidden Costs of Mandatory Long-Term Compensation
Global Investment Regulation and Sovereign Funds