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Stealing within Marriage: Differences across Divorce Laws
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Michael Hanlon
Published/Copyright:
May 23, 2012
I consider individuals’ incentive to engage in Pareto inefficient behavior towards their spouse, which I envision as stealing within marriage. Under unilateral divorce, I predict this incentive is lower for some individuals, and higher for no one. Therefore, the incentive to steal within marriage is lower, in aggregate. Empirically, I find unilateral states have 80% more marriage and family therapists, ceteris paribus. If therapists are a mechanism to reduce stealing within marriage, then this evidence is consistent with the theory.
Published Online: 2012-5-23
©2012 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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- On the Optimal Regulation of Unread Contracts
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