15. Language and the signifying object: From convention to imagination
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Chris Sinha
Abstract
In this chapter we argue that intersubjectivity cannot be grounded in individual mental or representational content. Intersubjectivity, therefore, is not equivalent to “common knowledge”, rather common knowledge (indeed individual knowledge in the true representational sense) depends upon intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity is the fundamental basis of what Durkheim (and Searle following him) have called “social facts”, which are irreducible to (though they depend upon) biological and individual psychological facts. Intersubjectivity is based upon participation in joint action, and such participation also implicates the shared material, interobjective world. Participatory engagement with signifying objects accompanies and underpins the child’s entry into the symbolic realm of language, and makes possible the development of subjectivity and cultural identity through participation in narrative practices.
[It] is always difficult for the psychologist to think of anything ‘existing’ in a culture … We are, alas, wedded to the idea that human reality exists within the limiting boundary of the human skin! (Bruner 1966: 321)
The body is our general medium for having a world … Sometimes the meaning aimed at cannot be achieved by the body’s natural means; it must then build itself an instrument, and it projects thereby around itself a cultural world. (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 146)
Observation of O. at 2:4;5. Father goes to get him from the car seat. O. keeps his eyes closed, eyelids quivering slightly, with a slight smile. Then he opens his eyes and says “I’m sleeping”, laughing.
Abstract
In this chapter we argue that intersubjectivity cannot be grounded in individual mental or representational content. Intersubjectivity, therefore, is not equivalent to “common knowledge”, rather common knowledge (indeed individual knowledge in the true representational sense) depends upon intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity is the fundamental basis of what Durkheim (and Searle following him) have called “social facts”, which are irreducible to (though they depend upon) biological and individual psychological facts. Intersubjectivity is based upon participation in joint action, and such participation also implicates the shared material, interobjective world. Participatory engagement with signifying objects accompanies and underpins the child’s entry into the symbolic realm of language, and makes possible the development of subjectivity and cultural identity through participation in narrative practices.
[It] is always difficult for the psychologist to think of anything ‘existing’ in a culture … We are, alas, wedded to the idea that human reality exists within the limiting boundary of the human skin! (Bruner 1966: 321)
The body is our general medium for having a world … Sometimes the meaning aimed at cannot be achieved by the body’s natural means; it must then build itself an instrument, and it projects thereby around itself a cultural world. (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 146)
Observation of O. at 2:4;5. Father goes to get him from the car seat. O. keeps his eyes closed, eyelids quivering slightly, with a slight smile. Then he opens his eyes and says “I’m sleeping”, laughing.
Chapters in this book
- Prelim pages i
- Table of contents v
- Foreword. Shared minds and the science of fiction: Why theories will differ vii
- 1. Intersubjectivity: What makes us human? 1
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Part I. Development
- 2. Understanding others through primary interaction and narrative practice 17
- 3. The neuroscience of social understanding 39
- 4. Engaging, sharing, knowing: Some lessons from research in autism 67
- 5. Coming to agreement: Object use by infants and adults 89
- 6. The role of intersubjectivity in the development of intentional communication 115
- 7. Sharing mental states: Causal and definitional issues in intersubjectivity 141
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Part II. Evolution
- 8. Evidence for intentional and referential communication in great apes? 165
- 9. The heterochronic origins of explicit reference 187
- 10. The co-evolution of intersubjectivity and bodily mimesis 215
- 11. First communions: Mimetic sharing without theory of mind 245
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Part III. Language
- 12. The central role of normativity in language and linguistics 279
- 13. Intersubjectivity in the architecture of language system 307
- 14. Intersubjectivity in interpreted interactions: The interpreter's role in co-constructing meaning 333
- 15. Language and the signifying object: From convention to imagination 357
- Author index 379
- Subject index 383
Chapters in this book
- Prelim pages i
- Table of contents v
- Foreword. Shared minds and the science of fiction: Why theories will differ vii
- 1. Intersubjectivity: What makes us human? 1
-
Part I. Development
- 2. Understanding others through primary interaction and narrative practice 17
- 3. The neuroscience of social understanding 39
- 4. Engaging, sharing, knowing: Some lessons from research in autism 67
- 5. Coming to agreement: Object use by infants and adults 89
- 6. The role of intersubjectivity in the development of intentional communication 115
- 7. Sharing mental states: Causal and definitional issues in intersubjectivity 141
-
Part II. Evolution
- 8. Evidence for intentional and referential communication in great apes? 165
- 9. The heterochronic origins of explicit reference 187
- 10. The co-evolution of intersubjectivity and bodily mimesis 215
- 11. First communions: Mimetic sharing without theory of mind 245
-
Part III. Language
- 12. The central role of normativity in language and linguistics 279
- 13. Intersubjectivity in the architecture of language system 307
- 14. Intersubjectivity in interpreted interactions: The interpreter's role in co-constructing meaning 333
- 15. Language and the signifying object: From convention to imagination 357
- Author index 379
- Subject index 383
