Band 32, Heft 2

Mental attitude adverbials ( absichtlich ‚intentionally‘, freiwillig ‚voluntarily‘, etc.) are generally considered to be a homogeneous class of adverbials, the interpretation of which is regulated via the principle of compositionality. I challenge this view, proposing instead that the class of mental attitude adverbials is systematically divided into two subtypes, which I call Assimilative Adverbials ( A-Adverbials ) and Intentional Adverbials ( I-Adverbials ). In support of this proposal I present evidence that they differ in two ways: (i) They select different arguments: A-Adverbials require an agent, I-Adverbials require an initiator. I discuss additional restrictions on their interpretation and formulate lexical entries for each subtype. (ii) The two types provide different interpretation options: While A-Adverbials adhere strictly to the principle of compositionality, I-Adverbials allow pragmatically driven coercion. On the basis of this case study of mental attitude adverbials, I take a close look at the capabilities of and constraints on coercion. With this in mind, I examine the relation between the semantics and pragmatics of mental attitude adverbials in more detail. I show that particular grammatical restrictions on them also hold true under coercion, so that they continue to regulate and to restrict interpretation in these cases. Here admittedly, in contrast to compositional interpretation, the grammatical restrictions can be implemented more flexibly, i.e., they can be fulfilled at the conceptual level. This explains why coercion is limited to I-Adverbials : In the case of coercion, the conceptual structures of A-Adverbials do not satisfy these grammatical restrictions on their interpretation.

Scalar approaches to the semantics of gradation are generally based on the conception of degrees as either points or intervals. In this paper, I will review two prominent approaches which use intervals differently for modelling the polarity of adjectives. For a relevant subset of gradation phenomena, I will discuss several problems of these approaches and will develop a new proposal which is characterized by the assumption that for an attention-based, cognitivist semantics of gradation, both conceptions of degree are needed for a satisfactory solution of the problems.

In this paper I take issue with Antomo & Steinbach’s (2010) analysis of so-called weil -V2 clauses, by which the syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic properties distinguishing them from integrated verb-final weil -clauses are claimed to all follow from two central factors: (i) parataxis triggering prosodic desintegration, (ii) V2-order triggering assertional force potential. Support for this analysis is sought in a close comparison of weil -V2 clauses with V2 complement and relative clauses, which is claimed to reveal pertinent functional and structural parallels. – In arguing against this analysis, I show, first, that the assertional status of the weil -V2 clause is triggered solely by the semantics of weil in combination with true main clause status, hence V2 as such plays no role; second, that the argument from subordinate V2-cases fails as well; third, that the broader interpretational range of weil -V2 clauses is completely shared by unintegrated verb-final weil -clauses; hence this difference to integrated verb-final weil -clauses cannot be due to ±parataxis and/or ±V2, but only to ±syntactic desintegration and/or ±root status. In concluding, I summarize the central factors an alternative compositional analysis of weil -V2 clauses could be based on, and sketch two problems remaining for either analysis.