Volume 17, Issue 2

This Article examines the regulatory state through the lens of evolving political economy, arguing that a significant reconstruction is now underway. The ongoing shift from an industrial mode of development to an informational one has created existential challenges for regulatory models and constructs developed in the context of the industrial economy. Contemporary contests over the substance of regulatory mandates and the shape of regulatory institutions are most usefully understood as moves within a larger struggle to chart a new direction for the regulatory state in the era of informational capitalism. A regulatory state optimized for the information economy must develop rubrics for responding to three problems that have confounded existing regulatory regimes: (1) platform power — the power to link facially separate markets and/or to constrain participation in markets by using technical protocols; (2) infoglut — unmanageably voluminous, mediated information flows that create information overload; and (3) systemic threat — nascent, probabilistically-defined harm to be realized at some point in the future. Additionally, it must develop institutions capable of exercising effective oversight of informationera activities. The information-era regulatory models that have begun to emerge are procedurally informal, mediated by networks of professional and technical expertise that define relevant standards, and financialized. Such models, however, also have tended to be both opaque to external observation and highly prone to capture. New institutional forms that might ensure their legal and political accountability have been slow to develop.

Many countries find their information and digital policies still dominated by traditional stakeholders, particularly the content industry, major telecom companies, and marketing groups, yet Canada has experienced a notable shift in perspective with a strong and influential public interest voice. This shift toward public interest and participation in the development of Canadian information and digital policies has led to legislation, regulation, and policy outcomes that once seemed highly unlikely. This Article seeks to better understand the changing role of the public in Canadian information and digital policymaking by framing the developments as an ongoing policy development process featuring a series of closely linked changes and responses. The emergence of public participation on information and digital policy issues occurred across a spectrum of issues, yet the traits were strikingly similar: grassroots efforts reliant on social media and the Internet to capture media and public attention and focus it on consumer perspectives, minimal interest from government and regulators; and initial dismissal giving way to hostility from incumbent stakeholders. The Article identifies some of the reasons behind the shift, including the growing importance of information and digital policies, the impact of digital advocacy tools, and the shifting policy pyramid in which users have now largely leapfrogged corporate interests as policy influencers. While the shift does not mean the public interest wins on every issue, it does suggest an important change in influence with long-term ramifications for the development of information and digital policy in Canada that others may seek to emulate.

In this Article I argue that the emerging public/private nexus of surveillance involves the augmentation of state power and calls for new models of constitutional constraint. The key phenomenon is the role played by communications intermediaries in collecting the information that the state subsequently accesses. These intermediaries are not just powerful companies engaged in collecting and analyzing the information of users and the information they hold are not just business records. The key feature of these companies is that, through their information practices and architecture, they mediate other relationships. I argue that this mediating function, and its underlying technological form, interacts with legal and social norms in ways that can lead to the erosion of constraints on state power. This Article maps two stories of erosion, rooted in two kinds of community displacement. The first involves the displacement of community participation in law enforcement and the emergence of “technological tattletales” where intermediaries cooperate with the state. Unlike citizen cooperation, this practice augments state power and undermines more traditional informal modes of constraint on state power. The second involves the displacement of national legal and political community. Communications intermediaries are often large multinational companies that operate in multiple jurisdictions and move their data to various datacenters across the world even as the individual data subject remains in one geographical location. Laws that treat nonresident aliens differently from residents and citizens can create “constitutional black holes” where the communications data of an individual is not protected by any constitutional constraints.

Troubling patterns of suppressed speech have emerged on the corporate internet. A large platform may marginalize (or entirely block) potential connections between audiences and speakers. Consumer protection concerns arise, for platforms may be marketing themselves as open, comprehensive, and unbiased, when they are in fact closed, partial, and self-serving. Responding to protests, the accused platform either asserts a right to craft the information environment it desires, or abjures responsibility, claiming to merely reflect the desires and preferences of its user base. Such responses betray an opportunistic commercialism at odds with the platforms’ touted social missions. Large platforms should be developing (and holding themselves to) more ambitious standards for promoting expression online, rather than warring against privacy, competition, and consumer protection laws. These regulations enable a more vibrant public sphere. They also defuse the twin specters of monopolization and total surveillance, which are grave threats to freedom of expression.

Courts in the United States are finding that recipients can be bound by fine-print terms (boilerplate) if they had notice of them. Without directly confronting the overarching normative question whether notice can cause contractual obligation, this Article takes notice seriously by focusing on how psychological characteristics of “HUMANs” suggest rethinking of when effective notice is (or is not) likely to occur.

This Article examines a constitutional problem that largely goes unnoticed and unexamined by legal scholars — the problem of technosocial engineering of humans. After defining terms and explaining the nature of the problem, I explain how techno-social engineering of humans is easily ignored, as we perform constrained cost-benefit analyses of incremental steps without contemplating the path we are on. I begin with two nonfiction stories, one involving techno-social engineering of human emotions and a second involving technosocial engineering of children’s preferences. The stories highlight incremental steps down a path. Then, through plausible fictional extensions, I explore steps further down the path. The Article ends with a fact pattern familiar to every reader. It explains how the electronic contracting environment we experience regularly online is an example of techno-social engineering of humans with the (un) intended consequence of nudging humans to behave like machines — perfectly rational, predictable, and ultimately programmable.

Tinkering with technologies and other human-made artifacts is a longstanding practice. Freedom to tinker has largely existed without formal legal recognition. Tinkering has typically taken place in an unregulated zone within which people were at liberty to act unobstructed by others so long as they did not harm others. The main reason why it now seems desirable to articulate some legal principles about freedom to tinker and why it needs to be preserved is because freedom to tinker is being challenged by some legal developments. This Article explains that user-innovators have traditionally had considerable freedom to tinker under trade secrecy, patent, and trademark laws. Although copyright law permits a modest degree of tinkering with existing products, it restricts freedom to tinker more than other IP laws. Copyright law and sometimes contract law place substantial constraints on user rights to tinker with and modify computer programs and other digital works. These constraints are of particular concern to tinkerers because computer programs are embedded in such a wide range of technologies these days. This Article offers suggestions about how and why the law should protect a zone of freedom to tinker for socially beneficial purposes.

This Article aims to draw the connection between how we conceptualize legal rights over information resources and our capacity to develop technologically neutral legal norms in the information age. More specifically, it identifies and critically examines three competing approaches to the idea of technological neutrality apparent in copyright jurisprudence. Ultimately, it is argued that true technological neutrality requires not simply the seamless expansion of legal rights into new technological contexts, but the careful, contextual recalibration of rights and interests in light of shifting values and changing circumstances. As a normative principle, technological neutrality in copyright law thus demands a nuanced and relational understanding of the rights at play, and the social values that they seek to foster as technologies evolve.

This Article explores the rule of law aspects of the intersection between intellectual property and antitrust law. Contemporary discussions and debates on intellectual property (IP), antitrust, and the intersection between them are typically framed in economically oriented terms. This Article, however, shows that there is more law in law than just economics. It demonstrates how the rule of law has influenced the development of several IP doctrines, and the interface between IP and antitrust, in important, albeit not always acknowledged, ways. In particular, it argues that some limitations on IP rights, such as exhaustion and limitations on tying arrangements, are grounded in rule of law principles restricting the arbitrary exercise of legal power, rather than solely in considerations of economic efficiency. The historical development of IP law has reflected several tensions, both economic and political, that lie at the heart of the constitutional order of the modern state: the tension between the benefits of free competition and the recognition that some restraints on competition may be beneficial and justified; the concern that power, even when conferred in the public interest, can often be abused and arbitrarily

The current concerns with laggard growth and income inequality have led to a widespread set of demands for more regulation and higher taxation to reverse the trend. These two approaches move matters exactly in the wrong direction. The correct response is to find ways to reduce tax burdens and barriers to entry, and to reduce the political uncertainty associated with new government measures. It may well be too late, worldwide, for a substantial rollback in the welfare state. But the current proposals will only prolong the dismal results on both fronts in any arena in which they are tried.