Volume 11, Issue 2

The causal exclusion argument against the causal efficacy of non-reducible mental properties relies on a causal closure principle for the physical domain, and on a causal exclusion principle ruling out systematic causal overdetermination. The notion of causal sufficiency is typically used in formulating both these principles. I argue that the causal exclusion principle has to be substantially revised in light of counterexamples where causal sufficiency is preserved among closely related cause candidates. This crucially affects the causal exclusion argument, and I specify which among several versions of the causal closure principle are compatible with the causal efficacy of mental properties.

Within philosophy and psychology the view is today being advanced that the well-being of a person is essentially related to the person's capacity to construct and live out meaningful life narratives. Most notably, thinkers such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Paul Ricoeur and Charles Taylor represent this narrative view of the person within philosophy. Through a reading of Søren Kierkegaard's notion of the person this paper argues that the narrative view is ultimately untenable. The well-being of the person, it is argued, is not a matter of establishing meaningful narratives, but a matter of wholeheartedly willing to be oneself. In discussing the notion of willing wholeheartedly the paper links Kierkegaard to Harry G. Frankfurt's philosophy of personhood.

The no miracles argument (NMA) is often suggested as being the most convincing argument for scientific realism. It is recognized that NMA is an instance of a more general principle of inference: inference to the best explanation (IBE). In the most viable accounts of IBE, it is acknowledged that the mode of inference is context-sensitive. By employing the points that follow from the context-sensitivity of explanation I show that a common formulation of NMA is faulty, or at best will be restricted in its scope. Interestingly, this mirrors how explanation arguments for the existence of God fail. Swinburne (The Existence of God, 2 nd Oxford University Press, 2004) has argued that we can construct an explanation argument for theism against a position that he calls physicalism. I argue that arguing for worldviews such as theism and physicalism by means of employing scientific methodology such as IBE fails. This is so because hypothesis evaluation takes place relative to background theory, and in Swinburne's suggested argument, there is no neutral common ground that we can appeal to for evaluating whether theism or physicalism is the best explanation of the facts we wish to explain

The paper focuses on why John Dewey, in his revised 1932 edition of Ethics , came to perceive the right as (relatively) independent from the good and on the consequences this has for his own classical version of pragmatism. It is argued that whereas Dewey is correct in making this revision, he himself never found a way of uniting this novel insight with his pragmatic project as presented in (among other places) the original 1908 editon of Ethics , or other central works such as Human Nature and Conduct and The Quest for Certainty . The reason for this, it is argued, is that whereas Dewey is correct in claiming that it is neither satisfactory to view the right merely as dependent on, or merely as independent from, the good, these two approaches ought to be perceived as two distinct perspectives on the self that it is both necessary and desirable to keep apart from each other.

This paper diagnoses a certain culture of complaint, which is a curious formation in the history of mankind that emerges exactly at the moment where the claim, that the “grand narratives” have lost their meaning, goes from being merely an academic postulate to becoming a commonly accepted cultural dogma. Rather than joyfully accepting the liberation from the ostensibly repressive grand narratives, the reaction typical of the members of the culture of complaint has been to blame the big Other for his non-existence. Having discussed this point we proceed to discuss the possibility of genuine political action, given such a bleak prognosis of our own current post-modern predicament. Via the literary work of Franz Kafka, a discussion is opened about the possibilities and constraints on political action in an era where transcendent legitimization is no longer available. The discussion partners are (first) Jacques Derrida, and Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari and Jacques Lacan.

This paper explores the issue of musical performance evaluation, which has received very little attention in contemporary philosophy of music. I first develop a view of performative interpretation of music that builds on recent accounts of musical meaning and representation. As an alternative to the conception of musical performances underlying pluralist views of musical performance evaluation that have been popular lately, I shall offer a view which sees the articulation of understanding of the work performed as an important element of musical performances. Theories of musical meaning and representation I discuss in the article are intended to illuminate what articulating an understanding of a musical piece through a musical performance means, and how musical performances can be evaluated on the basis of the view they afford of the work performed. After discussing an extensive example, I examine the effect of the account of performance evaluation I offer in the article on the question regarding the relevance of the composer's performing intentions for performance evaluation. In the last section, I compare the alternative view sketched in the article with recent pluralistic conceptions of evaluation in more detail. My view is that the two are in no way incompatible. Rather, the view of performance evaluation I develop in the article manages to supplement the pluralist conception of musical performance evaluation in some important respects.

Ernst Cassirer's philosophy has been in the process of being rehabilitated for more than 20 years. From being considered hopelessly obsolete by most trendsetting philosophers of the 20 th century, if considered at all, Cassirer's philosophy is now being discussed in serious quarters of the philosophical community. What has happened?