Explanation Arguments for Scientific Realism and Theism – Faulty or Restricted in Scope?

Abstract

The no miracles argument (NMA) is often suggested as being the most convincing argument for scientific realism. It is recognized that NMA is an instance of a more general principle of inference: inference to the best explanation (IBE). In the most viable accounts of IBE, it is acknowledged that the mode of inference is context-sensitive. By employing the points that follow from the context-sensitivity of explanation I show that a common formulation of NMA is faulty, or at best will be restricted in its scope. Interestingly, this mirrors how explanation arguments for the existence of God fail. Swinburne (The Existence of God, 2^nd Oxford University Press, 2004) has argued that we can construct an explanation argument for theism against a position that he calls physicalism. I argue that arguing for worldviews such as theism and physicalism by means of employing scientific methodology such as IBE fails. This is so because hypothesis evaluation takes place relative to background theory, and in Swinburne's suggested argument, there is no neutral common ground that we can appeal to for evaluating whether theism or physicalism is the best explanation of the facts we wish to explain