Volume 21, Issue 2

This paper presents an analysis of the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 through the lens of the Theory of Moves as formalized by [Willson, S.J., (1998), Long-term Behavior in the Theory of Moves, Theory and Decision, vol. 45, no. 3, pp. 201–240]. It derives the equilibrium (ultimate outcome) states under various assumptions about Western and Russian preferences over outcomes. The “paths” of their generation, i.e., the sequences of strategic choices made by each side, are also explored, casting light on the structure of incentives guiding behavior in the conflict, and perhaps predicting what the actual outcome will be when the world moves beyond this crisis. Incomplete information on preferences prevents derivation of a unique prediction of the outcome of the crisis, but the analysis enables us to substantially narrow the range of possibilities.

This paper examines the tactical redistribution of public resources by an incumbent seeking reelection in a country in the midst of an armed conflict. The illegal armed groups in Colombia are known to have extreme ideological beliefs; the guerrillas lean far to the Left, and the paramilitaries, far to the Right. The model and the empirical results show that regions with powerful groups who have a defined political ideology are less strategically attractive when it comes to the distribution of government resources. Nevertheless, when an illegal group can coerce voters to support a candidate and decide between candidates, as in the case of paramilitaries, redistribution is targeted to the illegal group. As a natural experiment, this paper empirically tests the effect of a policy to demobilize and reintegrate the members of paramilitary groups into society, so as to show the decisions on redistribution change when paramilitary forces do not exercise control in the municipalities.

Studies have shown that citizens’ risk-perceptions and risk-assessment are affected by large scale terrorist acts. Reported evidence shows that individuals are often willing to trade-off civil liberties for enhanced security particularly as a post-terrorist attack reaction as well as adopting more conservative views. Within this strand of the literature, this paper examines whether terrorism and in particular mass-casualty terrorist attacks affect citizens’ political self-placement on the left-right scale of the political spectrum. To this effect the Eurobarometer surveys for 12 European Union countries are utilized and ordered logit models are employed for the period 1985–2010 with over 230,000 observations used in the estimations. On balance, the findings reported herein seem to be pointing to a shift in respondents’ self-positioning towards the right of the political spectrum.

This paper documents the reallocation of financial and economic resources after political violence to other countries. It analyzes the impact of 66 political violence events that took place in 32 countries on 57 stock exchanges over a period of 20 years. Using the event study methodology, this paper is the first to document a positive financial impact from political violence in other countries. The results show that in globally integrated markets, the substitution of financial and economic activities away from afflicted countries magnifies their losses. On average over a 20 day window, event countries suffered a 2.9% drop in stock valuation while other countries picked a windfall of 0.8%. Additionally, the paper investigates the geographic, economic, and risk determinants of this cross-border flow of capital.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or “drones” have become a core component of the US military arsenal following September 11, 2001. In much of the literature and public discourse regarding drones, it is assumed that drone policy is created within the broader “public interest.” That is, those who construct drone policy set aside private incentives and other motives to construct policy solely to achieve the goals of US citizens and maximize some larger social welfare function. This paper identifies the conjectures associated with this public interest ideal and examines their accuracy. I find a general disconnect between the evidence and the public interest assumption. In several cases, the evidence directly contradicts the assumption of public interest. In light of these findings I offer an alternative analytical framework, the “public choice” framework to adjudicate between observed realities and stated goals.