Volume 24, Issue 1

This paper discusses how Kierkegaard’s aesthete in Either/Or ’s “Diapsalmata” and “Rotation of Crops” attempts to apply Hegel’s principle of mediation to everyday decision-making. This paper has two main goals: First, it provides an in-depth analysis of exactly how the aesthete’s approach to decision-making follows the dialectical pattern of Hegelian mediation. Second, it argues that even though the aesthete meets with unfortunate results, the aesthete cannot be so easily dismissed. The aesthete’s Hegelian perspective is still relevant to daily life because it provides an insightful view into how we ourselves sometimes approach decisions and cope with the difficulty of making decisions.

Fear and Trembling ’s goal is illuminating the difficulty of faith. Silentio claims that whereas both knights of resignation and knights of faith are dancers, only the knight of faith can dance perfectly, doing what perhaps no dancer can do: he does not “hesitate” in the moment between landing from his leap and assuming the position from which to reengage with finitude. This surprising invocation of dance has not been given sustained attention in the literature on Fear and Trembling. Given Kierkegaard’s surprisingly precise grasp of classical ballet’s vocabulary and aesthetic, I examine how these provide him additional power to clarify the difference between faith and resignation.

In Chapter 2 of the Philosophical Fragments , Søren Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes Climacus poetises about a “king who loved a maiden.” Climacus concludes this venture with a bold claim: what he has just described is “so different from any human poem” that it should not be regarded as a poem at all, but as “the wonder” [ Vidunderet ] which leads one to exclaim in adoration that “[t]his thought did not arise in my own heart!” In the subsequent chapter of Philosophical Fragments , Climacus proceeds to offer a number of arguments against demonstrations of God’s existence, leading many scholars to conclude that he represents an unequivocally anti-rationalist perspective. Against such interpretations, this paper will seek to highlight how Climacus’ claims track those of the seventeenth century Dutch lens-grinder and rationalist philosopher, Baruch Spinoza. From this, it will be argued that “the wonder” in Climacus’ thought takes the form of an indirect, ethico-existentialist argument for the truth of Christianity’s incarnate God.

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it seeks to demonstrate how Kierkegaard’s deployment of the idea of earnestness can furnish a sort of tonal “unity” to a narrative understanding of the Kierkegaardian self, which gestures toward a solution to the problem of how a narrative self can be unified over time and over a multiplicity of projects and plans. Second, this paper aims to give further richness to the recent work of Patrick Stokes, who argues that the narrative self needs to be supplemented by what he calls a naked self. This paper then argues that because there are these two dimensions to selfhood—the narrative person and the naked self—the Kierkegaardian individual is in a fundamental way not so much a matter of identity as of contradiction or internal tension.

This article examines the subjective structure and genesis of personal identity in (some of) Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writings. Based on a structural analysis of self-awareness (here, in particular, the category of existential becoming, the social embeddedness of the individual and the irreducible fact of mediation of personal identity), the main thesis is that, according to Kierkegaard, personal identity can best be described as a constant interweaving of hypertextual and intertextual layers. Accordingly, the central metaphor of palimpsest is used in order to account for the self-relation as an overwriting process, realized by a constant self-reinterpretation of the individual. The article focuses on certain structural, existential, hermeneutic, and semiotic key aspects of such an interpretation.

In Fear and Trembling Kierkegaard (alias Johannes de Silentio) writes that Abraham intended to sacrifice Isaac for God’s sake as well as for his own sake. Drawing mainly on The Sickness unto Death I will argue that Kierkegaard construes Abraham as becoming a true self, that is, as someone who becomes self-transparent before God. What this means and how our relationship with God is supposed to be involved in the process of becoming a self is the focus of my paper. While various articles have been written on that topic, my aim here is to give the most charitable interpretation of Kierkegaard’s theses and the theological concepts involved.

This paper explores Kierkegaard’s method of irony and his distinct conception of temporality through the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. It suggests that Kierkegaard makes an ironic use of the term ‘sacrifice.’ Rather than asking us to abandon all human preferential relationships in favor of an abstract (religious) love to an anonymous neighbor, it advances the view that Kierkegaard’s prime objective is therapeutic. Kierkegaard seeks to disabuse us of the idea that we can fully possess faith, or indeed, anything meaningful whatsoever, such as the love that pulsates in our hearts for a family member, romantic partner, friend, or even to ourselves.

Alienation is a key theme in both the philosophical tradition of the 19 th century that begins with Hegel and Marx and in the heterogenous school of existentialist thought in the 20 th century. Kierkegaard is often included in narratives of these philosophical traditions, but his contribution to this topic is problematic. Unlike figures such as Marx or Sartre, he almost never uses the term “alienation” explicitly. The question then becomes one of interpretation: what ideas in Kierkegaard bear a meaningful family resemblance to the concept as it is found in other thinkers in these traditions? In this article I have identified three different texts from Kierkegaard in which concepts are discussed that I believe can be rightfully designated as forms of alienation: “The Unhappiest One,” from Either/Or , “The Present Age” from A Literary Review , and the different stages of despair in The Sickness unto Death. The goal is simply to use these texts as the basis or starting point for developing an understanding of Kierkegaard’s concept of alienation. This will then in turn help us to determine more precisely his contribution to the development of philosophy in the 19 th and 20 th centuries.

In 1849, Kierkegaard published The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air: Three Devotional Discourses, which were closely followed by two discourses on the woman who was a sinner, published in 1849 and 1850. I argue that these discourses are intended to set the stage to learn how to embody Christian love from the woman. Kierkegaard’s claims about what is required to teach Christian virtue imply that the woman becomes more than loving, she becomes love. I explore his notion of acquired originality and how applied philosophical concepts such as automaticity and skillful coping elucidate this notion.

The paper argues that the question of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms has been largely misconceived. Referencing comparable devices such as anonymity, noms de plume , and heteronyms, and drawing on Heidegger’s discussion of Kierkegaardian pseudonymity in the lectures on Parmenides, the paper further distinguishes between fictional characters (e. g. the Seducer and Assessor Vilhelm), noms de plume (H.H.), fictional editors, and pseudonyms proper. It is argued that in the first authorship only Constantin Constantius and Johannes Climacus approximate to the criteria Kierkegaard himself lays down for pseudonymity. Furthermore, Kierkegaard’s anxieties regarding the form of publication of his works in the late 1840s reveals the whole project of pseudonymity collapsing into incoherence. By means of a comparison with Nietzsche, it is argued that Kierkegaard’s work is less a manifold of different literary personalities and more a play of revealing/concealing voices. In these voices there is nevertheless a literary watermark that makes Kierkegaard’s work as a whole distinctively Kierkegaardian.

Kierkegaard portrays his role as an author with the image of a prompter in “An Occasional Discourse” of 1847. A prompter in the theatre whispers not his own words, but a text by someone else already familiar to the actors on stage. This raises the question as to which text Kierkegaard is prompting. I seek to answer the question through a close reading of his imagery of authorial withdrawal in this discourse in connection with his repeated description of his writings as readings of the original text of individual human existence-relationships, the old familiar text handed down from the fathers.

This article will argue that much of Kierkegaard’s authorship is reflective of the characteristics of the Eucharistic liturgy found in the 1830 Forordnet Alter-Bog for Danmark (confession, invitation, preparation/exhortation, consecration, and thanksgiving/praise/blessing), particularly as each of those elements of the liturgy are reflected in his seven Discourses at the Communion on Fridays in Part IV of Christian Discourses. Major components of his authorship function as an indirect invitation to the single individual reader to inwardly experience the prototype-redeemer dialectic as it was enacted in a typical Eucharistic liturgy of Kierkegaard’s day. The readers of Kierkegaard’s work make interpretive decisions not only about Kierkegaard’s texts, but most importantly about themselves, God, and the paradox of Christ, such that by the time they finish the authorship they find themselves inwardly standing at the foot of the altar, either offended by the paradox of Christ and ready to turn and leave, or beating their breasts alongside the tax collector.

Kierkegaard’s analysis of despair in The Sickness unto Death receives welcome, complementary illustrations in the novelistic efforts, respectively, of Franz Kafka ( The Trial ) and J.M. Coetzee ( Elizabeth Costello ). Both Kafka and Coetzee succeed in fashioning dramatic settings in which their protagonists may be seen and understood to suffer from the sickness unto death. In both cases, moreover, the distinctly spiritual character of despair is on display, as the protagonists in question slowly come to the realization that their cognitive faculties and resources will afford them no protection against, or immunity from, the despair they (correctly) see in others. Finally, both Kafka and Coetzee succeed in depicting the first-personal experience of despair as that of a progressively suffocating claustrophobia.

This article examines the challenges for understanding Kierkegaard’s philosophy from the perspective of our modern, heterogeneous societies, and seeks to define a humanism or existential ethics within Kierkegaard’s existential anthropology. After examining the problems inherent in Kierkegaard’s account of neighbor-love and human equality, we question the possibility of separating Kierkegaard’s existential anthropology from his Christian ontology. Suggesting that Kierkegaard’s philosophy does not leave us empty-handed, as political and social critiques claim, we sketch out the premises for a Kierkegaardian understanding of existential ethics which is not merely an ethics of self-accomplishment, but which places concern for others at the fore.

The first section of this paper argues that we can find in Kierkegaard an idea of equality, epitomized in the notion of “the neighbor” presented in Works of Love , which is highly relevant for, among other things, a critical engagement with today’s “identity politics.” The second section argues that Kierkegaard’s idea of equality is a religious-existential task, but also a task concerning our relationship with other human beings. The third section demonstrates how this idea of equality is evinced in the notion of “the neighbor.” The last section offers some reflections on how we might begin to rethink the political based on this idea of equality.

This paper examines the connection between Kierkegaard’s philosophy of existence and Graham Harman’s object-oriented ontology. The claim is that Harman’s position provides a conceptual apparatus that can beneficially address some basic ontological points in Kierkegaard about actuality, the self and the reality of individual subsisting mind-independent entities. On the other hand, Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the human self as a place situated in existence can provide a supplement to Harman’s realism which implicitly relies on topological notions. If we define an entity, in a broad sense of the term, as something in its own right irreducible to its being-in-a-relation, but we do not want to end up in a frozen universe of isolated monads, we must revisit the notion of relationality in terms of vicarious causation (Harman) or indirect communication (Kierkegaard).

Our engagement with social media, smart and mobile technologies is ambiguous and raises existential questions about the naturalness and desirability of hyper-connectivity. On the one hand, we benefit from using these technologies in organizing and socializing our everyday life. On the other hand, they further complicate our lives. Hence, in recent years, more and more people choose to abstain from digital media by taking on a so-called ‘digital detox,’ a period of living without these technologies. In this article, we look at ‘digital detoxing’ from an existential perspective by introducing Kierkegaard’s existential categories of repetition and recollection to tackle the question whether ‘dropping out’ is a meaningful act or a temporary respite. What would it mean, so we ask, to find a proper balance in a world that demands constant connectivity?

This essay is an attempt to link aspects of Kierkegaard’s experimental writings with new contemporary ecological perspectives which—in the act of interpenetration—are fusing philosophy, science, literature, anthropology, political thought, new economic perspectives, and visual and sound media, in order to open up new ways to live and flourish on a damaged planet—in our “age of disintegration.” I present Kierkegaard’s diagnosis of his time as “the age of disintegration” (from 1848) as something that can be connected to the contemporary socio-political conditions in late modernity, and to the new epoch on the horizon which we are now experiencing. I interpret Kierkegaard’s expression “out into the middle of life” as the kernel of Kierkegaard’s authorship of interruption and unsettling. I argue it can be implicitly included in aspects of ecological perspectives offered by innovative writers today.