Volume 5, Issue 6

Developing countries have sought to profit from the bioethical vacuum that has come about when President Bush in 2001 called for a moratorium on federal funding of human embryo stem cell research (hESR). Seizing the opportunity, both China and India started to invest proportionally many available resources in advanced technology and hESR, in the hope to achieve economic success. We argue that for the following reasons this field is hazardous especially for large developing countries: a. Capital resources are relatively important to poorer countries; b. Lucrative applications are not guaranteed: losses are harder to compensate in countries with little surplus; c. The benefits of possible profits may not go to the needy; d. It may be harder for China and India to advance in these advanced fields because of their institutional history in the field of science and technology; e. Even if applications are successful, there is a chance of developing countries becoming so-called techno-coolies: supplying standard advanced technologies, using human resources that are rare elsewhere in the world; f. A rush to grab the emerging opportunity obtained as a result of the bioethical vacuum may lead to overlooking appropriate monitoring and regulatory measures, hampering the formation of long term international collaborations and public trust. Secondly, we discuss government policies on the institutional aspects of hESR that have made China relatively attractive to foreign investors compared to India. In the concluding part, we discuss various dimensions of bioethics with regards to hESR, and how governing bodies mobilise cultural resources as economic capital.

The U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 S. Ct. 764, 166 L. Ed.2d 604 (2007) created new licensing challenges for biomedical and biotechnology companies. At issue in MedImmune was whether Article III of the U.S. Constitution limiting jurisdiction of federal courts to just “Cases and Controversies,” as expressed in the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), requires a patent licensee to first terminate or breach its license agreement before it can seek a declaratory judgment that the underlying patent to the license is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed. The MedImmune Court held that a patent licensee need not repudiate its licensing agreement and cease making royalty payments to satisfy the “actual controversy” requirement for filing a declaratory judgment action in order to challenge the validity of the licensed patent. Presented herein are suggested provisions whereby licensors in the biomedical and biotechnology fields can attempt to neutralize the licensee skewed effects of MedImmune . The suggested provisions include mechanisms to shift what triggers termination of the license; financial penalties on the licensee upon challenge or its success; and reserving the licensor's right to the licensor to drastically reduce the scope of the license upon challenge to the validity of the licensed patent if brought by the licensee. Subsequent legal challenge will likely be necessary to determine whether the suggested provisions and similar strategies will be enforceable in view of MedImmune and on public policy grounds as the Supreme Court expressly declined to rule whether a licensor may impose such conditions in a license as a condition for a license grant.

The aim of this article is to reflect on the role of ethics and morality in EU law. Two specific biolegal fields of study constitute the primary object in this regard; funding of research into human embryonic stem cells (hESCs) and the patentability hereof. The reason why the choice has fallen upon these aspects in particular is that they are both pivotal to the pursuit and realisation of the therapeutic and commercial prospects ascribed to hESC research. Whilst the said prospects are enormous the Member States' different outlook upon the permissibility of engaging in such activities is, however, equally immense because of their different cultural background and religious inheritance. Due to the various approaches towards the ethical issues raised in this regard the European Community is therefore faced with a great challenge. It is in the light of this challenge that the reflections on the role of ethics and morality in EU law are to be seen.

This paper addresses the need for more attention to be paid to altruism as a fundamentally underpinning any bioethical enquiry. I argue along with Bernard Williams that altruism is necessary to morality, and if this is the case, it is necessary for bioethics. In following a Kantian line on altruism, I take issue with the consequentialist component of Beau-champ and Childress treatment of beneficence, and argue that altruism paired with solidarity is a better match. However, even here it is my contention that altruism is required to give solidarity normative force.