Volume 11, Issue 2

This paper modifies the Acemoglu–Robinson model of the economic basis of democracy to discuss the impact of the international regime regulating capital flows on the consolidation and quality of democracy. Two regimes of capital mobility are considered, Bretton Woods and Rodrik’s hyperglobalization, in an international economy formed by an advanced North and a developing South. The model shows that hyperglobalization compromises the stability of democracy in the South by limiting the ability of the citizens to tax the elite and provide public goods which are critical for technical change and income distribution. At variance with the mainstream results, it is argued that financial globalization is a barrier to democratic consolidation. The model is consistent with key findings of the empirical literature on globalization and democracy, as well as with evidence from the economic history of Latin America.

This paper offers a systematic survey of recent research evaluating the impact of the level and volatility of the real exchange rate (RER) on economic growth. Existing empirical work finds a positive association between RER levels and economic growth, especially in developing countries. This relationship appears to be driven by cases of overvaluation hurting and undervaluation favoring growth. RER volatility, in turn, has a negative impact on growth. Together with the review of the literature, panel growth regressions with the 9.0 version of the Penn World Table database are carried out to evaluate previous findings. The paper also surveys the literature studying the mechanisms that explain the positive growth effect of the RER. One of them emphasizes that an undervalued RER reduces macroeconomic volatility, favoring capital accumulation and growth. Another one stresses that a competitive RER stimulates capital accumulation in modern tradable activities, facilitating structural change and economic development.