Volume 11, Issue 2 -

The article examines how international constitutionalism has come to grips with the phenomenon of informal law-making by non-State actors. The article identifies two opposing trends within the constitutionalist camp in relation to the question of actor informality. The first strand argues that all normative utterances should be presumed to give rise to law, irrespective of authorship (‘presumptive law thesis’). The presumptive law thesis is discussed and rejected on the ground that it rests on a model of participation in decision-making that dramatically departs from the existing one. The article continues by exploring the second strand of constitutionalism, which advocates in favour of retaining the distinction between direct and indirect participation in international decision-making (’the formal/informal participation model’). It is argued that, while this strand of constitutionalism is convincing at the descriptive level, it does not really add much to our existing knowledge. The last part of the article addresses the meta-question of the added value of analysing the phenomenon of actor informality through the lens of constitutionalism. It is argued that, despite its shortcomings, the constitutionalist project bravely attempts to frame the inherently political debate on global governance in legal terms, thereby attesting to the continuing relevance of international law as a regulatory mechanism in modern international relations.

A constitution defines the values of a particular community, and establishes institutions to realize these values. In defence of the argument that the United Nations Charter is the world’s constitution, I will try to show that it contains the shared values and norms of the international community, and that the UN’s organs are tasked with the promotion and protection of the shared values and norms as defined in the UN Charter. The focus is on the values of human dignity and peace and security.

The social contract in Egypt has changed dramatically five times in the past decade. Mubarak made substantial amendments in 2005 and 2007, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) ratified the 2011 Constitutional Declaration, the Muslim Brotherhood adopted the 2012 Constitution and, finally, Al-Sisi/Mansur proclaimed the 2014 Constitution. Currently, Egypt faces social, economic, political and legal problems. The Egyptian judiciary plays a vital role in the inability to respond to these problems. This research argues that the call for judicial reform should be revived to face contemporary challenges. These challenges are the result of the absence of serious judicial reform in the past four decades. The 1973 Judicial Authority Law was a result of the social contract presented in the 1971 Constitution. The research lists the reasons for adopting a new judicial authority law. In the first section, the social aspect is embodied in the protection of freedoms, judicial transparency and judicial legitimacy. The second section dealing with economic reasons for reform is divided into two parts. The first deals with Independent Bodies and Regulatory Agencies. The second issue reveals the role of the judiciary in the successive failures of the IBRA. The third section deals with the role of the judiciary in political life. The fourth section presents the legal reasons for judicial reform.

The limitation of nullity appeals to cases of ‘serious concerns regarding the correctness of the facts’ on which the lower court based upon its decision is in conformity with constitutional law. It does not violate the procedural safeguards protected by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights or the right to equal protection under the law protected by Article 7 of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Law. Despite the restrictive application in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Austria, the limitation is proportionate und thus constitutional, as such limitations only apply to rulings by a penal of lay judges.

Pursuant § 188 para 2 of the Austrian Civil Code ( Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch , hereinafter: ABGB), a third person can be entitled to access to a child if this is in the child’s best interest. A court has to grant access to the child upon request of the child, the child’s parents or a third person, provided the latter has or had a genuine social or family relationship with the child. Upon request of an individual to repeal parts of this provision the Constitutional Court held that there was no violation of the rights guaranteed under Article 8 ECHR.

The Constitutional Court used the case of a constitutional complaint filed by a former member of the Chamber of Deputies to provide a comprehensive view of the scope of parliamentary immunity. Indirectly overruling previous case law of the Supreme Court, this Court adhered to a more restrictive interpretation of the relevant constitutional provisions. According to this decision, members of parliament can rely on their constitutional protection only with regard to the communication of information or expression of an opinion verbally, in writing, visually, or in another way at a meeting of the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate, their committees, subcommittees, and commissions or their bodies, that is aimed at the participants of the meeting rather than just at the television audience or radio listeners.

The Constitutional Court found that Article 48 of the Constitution of Romania enshrines and guarantees the right to marriage and family relations resulting from marriage, apart from the right to family life/respect for and protection of family life, a concept with a much broader legal content, which is also embodied and protected by Article 26 of the Constitution. Insofar the analysis is limited solely to the scope of the right to marriage, the proposed amendment of Article 48 of the Constitution, ie replacement of the words ‘of the spouses’ with the words ‘between a man and a woman’, constitutes a mere indication as regards the exercise of the fundamental right to marriage, namely the specific determination of the fact that marriage is concluded between partners of different biological sex. The amendment proposed is not likely cause the disappearance, removal, deletion or cancellation of the concept of marriage. Furthermore, the safeguards of the right to marriage, as enshrined in the constitutional text of reference in its original form, remain unchanged. Therefore, the initiative for revision of the Constitution is constitutional in respect of the provisions of Article 152 of the Constitution, as it does not remove the right to marriage or the safeguards thereof and it does not bring into question any other limit on matters of revision.