Band 8, Heft 2

In the late 1950 s René Savatier foretold that the qualification of economic value itself as property (bien ) would have been the ultimate evolution of the theory of property rights. This prediction has come true with regard to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Court of Justice (CJEU). This paper investigates the implications of the understanding of property developed by the two European Courts on the concept of expropriation itself as well as for the principles governing expropriation law. Hence, the paper illustrates the role played by both the ECtHR and the CJEU in laying down the parameters of legitimacy for national law, including property law. Within this context, the focus falls on cases in which the Courts characterize the facts as deprivation of property requiring for compensation, even though the relevant property could not be the object of expropriation under the domestic law of the defendant State. My contribution brings new insights into the current transformation of the traditional property categories and suggests the reinterpretation of some key concepts of expropriation law.

In 1998 Mr Msiza, a labour tenant, successfully instituted a claim in terms of land reform legislation (the Land Reform (Labour Tenant) Act) for ownership of the land that he and his father occupied for six decades. In terms of this legislation, when the labour tenant is awarding the land, the owner of the land must be compensated for the loss of the land. In 2004, the Land Claims Court confirmed the award of land and ordered the state to make sure that Mr Msiza gets a title deed for the land. The case was heard again in 2016 in the Land Claims Court, where the court this time examined the question of compensation to be paid to the owner. The Land Claims Court ruled that the Constitutional compensation requirement is “just and equitable” compensation, and awarded less-than-market-value compensation by subtracting a seemingly arbitrary amount from the market value of the land. This decision was overturned in 2017 when the Supreme Court of Appeal ruled that the the just and equitable question were already considered in the calculation of market value, and therefore ruled that no amount be deducted from what the valuers calculated to be market value. The handling of the case, and the different approaches from the two courts, is a symptom of the uncertainty that judges are confronted with when they have to calculate “just and equitable” compensation. A history of the case will reveal that the inability to properly valuate the land, perpetuated the injustice that Mr Msiza is facing, of not having the land registered in his name, despite a valid award in terms of land reform legislation. This paper will show how the compensation requirement is a hurdle to Mr Msiza receiving the title deed to his land. By making use of the valuation reports and the court materials, the paper will endeavour to indicate what a better outcome would be, by focussing on the calculation of “just and equitable” compensation. The paper will argue for a purposive approach when interpreting legislation dealing with compensation, where the Constitutional purpose to “heal the divisions of the past” should play a central role in land reform cases.