Volume 39, Issue 2 - Special Section: Materialistic Pathe, Editors: Francesca G. Masi, Stefano Maso, Francesco Verde

This paper analyses chapter 58 of Theophrastus’ De sensibus , where Democritus’ account of phronein is famously presented. Democritus traces phronein to symmetria of the soul, that is conceived, in turn, as a state of thermic equilibrium, depending on his consideration of psyche as an aggregate of spherical and thin atoms flowing throughout the body and giving it life, movement, and perception. As a consequence, according to him, psychic states go hand in hand with changes in the body. In the following section of this paper, I offer additional evidence in favor of the controversial manuscript reading μετὰ τὴν κίνησιν. As a result, a consistent theory by Democritus can be reconstructed, according to which the balanced state of mobility and temperature of the psychic atoms concentrated in the head that generates a correct thinking necessarily follows the movement of sensible eidola throughout the body. In fact, a number of passages from Hippocratic writings attest that Democritus shared the key features of this explanation with the physiological and medical approach of the time.

The focus of this paper is the analysis of the epistemological and practical role played by pathe /affections in Epicurus’ philosophy. Epicurus firstly considered the affections not as emotional/passional conditions, but as firm criteria of truth and more specifically as the third criterion of the canonic (i.e. the epistemological part of his philosophical system). In this article the critical reactions (in particular by the Peripatetic side: Aristocles of Messene) against the Epicurean position about the function of the affections will be investigated too. Finally, two parts of this paper are devoted to the Cyrenaic tripartition of pathe (in all likelihood, a subject criticized by Epicurus) and to the probable doctrinal relationship between Epicurus’ pathe and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics Book 2.

Most ancient philosophers accept that dreams have prophetic powers enabling humans to relate somehow to a world beyond their own. The only philosophers known to make a clean and explicit break with that tradition are the Epicureans, beginning with Epicurus himself and reaching his last eminent follower, Diogenes of Oinoanda. They openly reject the idea that dreams mediate between the divine and the human realms, or between the world of the living and the world of the dead. They demystify the phenomenon of dreaming by explaining sleeping and dreaming in terms of their materialistic physical theory. Importantly, they examine dreams and their content from different perspectives and explore their relevance to our lives. The general aim of this paper is to offer a synthetic account of the Epicurean view about dreaming and dreams, advance certain new hypotheses that seem worthy of consideration, and show how Epicurus and his followers integrate dream theory into their philosophy as a whole.

Lucretius devotes some sections of his De rerum natura to the treatment of dreams. He is particularly interested in the phenomenon of dream deception, namely the belief that the dreamt object is the object itself. This psychological phenomenon has some both unwanted and philosophically interesting implications. Firstly, from an ethical point of view, it can stimulate uncontrolled worries and feelings in the dreamer that undermine his/her mental tranquility and health. Secondly, from a physiological perspective, it seems to reveal a failure in the mechanism undergoing the formation of mental representation. Thirdly, from the epistemological point of view, it seems to compromise the veracity of mental representations. This paper aims to explain how Lucretius dealt with this phenomenon. In particular, it will show how he succeeded, on the one hand, to explain the nature and the origin of dream deception and of its emotional aspect, and, on the other hand, to preserve the informative contents of dreams and their correspondence to reality. For this purpose the present essay will address the following issues: (1) which is the condition of the soul and of the mind while sleeping; (2) what kind of mental activity is dreaming; (3) which is the nature and the origin of the simulacra responsible for dreams; (4) which is the contents of dreams and how dream deception comes about; (5) and finally why and how dream deception emotionally effects the dreamer.

This paper deals with the aetiological aspect of the Epicurean conception of passions. It is argued that the therapy of the soul relies on an overall explanation of the various emotional states, and that fear is at the core of this framework in so far as it is the root of most psychic troubles. The first part deals with fear in the context of the general theory of passions. The second part shows that this basic emotion is the root of injustice and political excessive ambition, in Lucretius’ De rerum natura . The third part puts the emphasis on the role of anxiety in passionate love, in the same text. Fear, in its various forms, appears to be the main cause of a number of pathological emotions. It may be concluded that the Epicurean therapy of emotions, far from dealing with separate passions from case to case, is based on a holistic approach of psychic states.

The article investigates how Diogenes of Oenoanda in his huge 2 nd cent. AD Epicurean wall inscription deals with the control of fear. It argues for restoring the fragmentary title of Diogenes’ Ethics –treatise with “feelings [of soul] and [body]”. In this way the importance given in Ethics to the evaluation of our feelings according to the Epicurean doctrine is reflected in the title. Diogenes in his introduction to the whole inscription lists up the control of irrational fears in the first place of achievements of Epicureanism. The analysis of the relevant passages on his Ethics results in assigning fr. 47 III–IV and NF 137 to a subsection dealing with fear of pain from diseases which on the inscription must have followed fr. 48. Fear from gods is abundantly discussed in the recently combined Theological Physics Sequence . The article argues, that this topic was not treated once more in Ethics . Indeed, the “unclear fear” mentioned in fr. 35 ( Ethics ) refers, as a comparison with Epic. Ep. Hdt . 81–82 and Phld. De Dis I shows, not to some sort of feeling triggered by wrong tales on gods, but to an irrational fear of death.

The paper compares the two components of the Stoic definition of pathos , the logico-linguistic component and the physiological, ‘pneumatic’ one, in order to examine the role that each of them plays in the onset of pathos , its persistence in the human soul, its possible eradication. The analysis is focused on anger (ὀργή) which reveals some peculiarities, especially as regards its logical structure, due to the fact that this passion seems to be the combination of two different feelings. The anger indeed is classified as a species of desire but the description of its onset also includes pain.

The mechanism of emotions in Stoicism has been presented by Graver a decade ago as relying on a “pathetic syllogism” having as its premises a judgment about the goodness of a certain type of object and a judgment that it is proper to have a certain emotional response to that object. It is true that each emotion is an irrational impulse resulting not only from the opinion that something is good but also from the opinion that it is appropriate to have a certain type of emotional response to that object, as shown by Graver. However, the present paper intends to present an alternative to Graver’s view by reducing the mechanism of emotion to the mechanism of all impulses: each impulse is an assent given to the impression that it is befitting for me to accomplish certain actions, and what Cicero and Stobaeus describe is not the combination of two premises resulting in an emotion as a conclusion, but the idea that it is necessary to give one’s assent to the impulsive impression to produce an emotion. Likewise, in Seneca, it is in such a way that a preliminary form of impulse is transformed into an emotion. A universal judgment about an object being good or a reaction being appropriate is certainly involved in certain emotions, but not in all of them, since many emotions depend on a fresh impression that overwhelms the general rational judgments of someone due to one’s insufficient mental preparation and to the weakness of one’s mind. In those cases, an emotion may involve the impression that a behaviour or a feeling is appropriate without endorsing the idea that it is universally good or appropriate, since the mechanism of the emotion relies on the vividness of one particular impression even against one’s system of beliefs.

If the ancient Stoics conceived passion as a judgment or the consequence of a judgment referring to external reality, it is correct to define their conception of the psyche as ‘monistic’; it is very different if we consider that passion is due to another faculty independent of reason. In this second case, a scenario opens up in which a realistic and ‘reified’ conception of passion emerges. With reference to this, in the Letter 113 Seneca discusses the paradoxical thesis of the ancient Stoic scholars according to whom “the soul is an animal”, just as virtues and passions are. Through a series of close logical arguments, he shows the absurdities that can be reached in this way. By comparing this letter with the De ira we can define the position of Seneca as a type of practical/operational imaginary dualism: the development of an original coherent form of monism. Not to give in to passion (for example to anger or libido) will not be just or not so much a psychological exercise of reason and will, but certainly a physical experience of resistance.

Does Anaxagoras admit that the world is destructible? Aëtius’ doxographical handbook says as much, and so does a doxographical scholion derived from Alexander of Aphrodisias’ lost commentary on Aristotle’s Physics (Frag. 539 Rashed) according to the transmitted text. However, because of other difficulties occurring in the same scholion, Rashed was led to correct not only this text, thus making it contradict Aëtius’ testimony, but also the entry dedicated to Plato. My article suggests that while Rashed’s corrections are superfluous, the problems that triggered them are of great interest for the history of the doxographical tradition, for the way in which this tradition was used by Alexander of Aphrodisias and Simplicius in their commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics and, last but not least, for the understanding of the difficulties that ancient interpreters had to confront when they had to make sense of the lines now known as Anaxagoras B12 DK – difficulties that modern interpreters have still to confront.