Volume 20, Issue 3

Peirce’s philosophy of language is woven around his pragmatic maxim. From early on in his scholarship to late, Peirce expanded his pragmatism into a fabric of semiotics. In this paper, Peirce’s pragmatism is taken to be an integral part of his semiotic system, and his method of making ideas clear is accounted for in terms of his theory of signs. For Peirce, a sign stands for or represents something in connection with some interpretant. This claim applies to linguistic expressions: words and sentences. A sign or a term refers to an object determined by its interpretant. In further analysis, object represented goes the way from immediate object to dynamic object, and interpretant from immediate through dynamic to logical interpretant. Departing from the prevailing scheme of sense–reference ascription, Peirce’s pragmatism is a method of determining meaning rather than a theory of what meaning is, and further, it is a semantic theory rather than a linguistic pragmatics. Making meaning clear goes through a semiotic process where linguistic signs, objects in the world, and the minds of speaker and hearer are intimately interrelated; it follows that Fregean anti-psychologism goes astray in the search for meaning.

Peirce’s concept of “community” is a philosophical notion closely intertwined with society. The production of knowledge within a community entails the characteristics of the “knowledge production chain” revealed by Peirce’s pragmatic maxim. Knowledge can only effectively grow within an open community that the dynamism of maxim has implied. The openness of the community essentially consists of two dimensions: internal structural openness and external orientation openness. Internal structural openness refers to the dynamic operation of the knowledge structure within a community. External orientation openness refers to the borderless nature of the community, that is, it can be open to other communities, accommodate the knowledge elements of others, and form its own developmental vitality. The open community relies on signs, where the mediating function sustains its operation. Signs partition and combine elements of experience, thereby carrying concepts and conveying information.

Whereas it is generally held that Peirce’s logic contributed largely to a proof of his pragmatism, particularly in the 1907 manuscript R318, the paper adopts an alternative approach and posits that after 1903, Peirce’s conception of the sign and the way it functions evolved significantly in the period leading to and including the various versions of this never-to-be-published article which set out his conception of pragmatism in 1907. The paper suggests that in attempting to explain his pragmatism in manuscript R318, Peirce was consciously departing from earlier conceptions of the sign and the way it relates to its two correlates. It suggests that this departure nevertheless contributed to the continuing evolution of his logic, and shows how R318 anticipates features of the systems described in the 23 December 1908 letter to Lady Welby and subsequent drafts while nevertheless being a completely different approach to signification. It finally suggests that there is a potential inconsistency in the definition of semiosis given in the manuscript and the theoretical distribution of the interpretant system described therein. The present paper is offered as one possible account of some stages in the evolution of Peirce’s logic.

Peirce’s pragmatic maxim is closely related to his conception of abduction. The acquisition of the actual effect required by the method of scientific reasoning expressed by Peirce’s maxim must be accomplished by resorting to abductive logic. Abductive logic starts from a surprising fact, derives a hypothetical explanation about that fact, and finally arrives at the possibility that the hypothesis is true. This is the process of abductive reasoning, as provided by Peirce, which is distinct from induction and deduction and generates explanatory views. Peirce opposed a unified and unchangeable concept of causality. He used different interpretations of causality to illustrate the considerable differences in people’s understanding of cause and effect in different periods. The concept of pragmatism, as developed from the pragmatic maxim to abduction and then to scientific inference to the best explanation, is precisely what Peirce initially proposed, and inference to the best explanation is the starting point and the final result of the pragmatic maxim.

I argue that the introduction of the normative sciences in Peirce’s 1903 Harvard Lectures was prompted by ethical concerns related to his pragmatic maxim and his pragmatism, generally. In the new formulation of the maxim, Peirce shows the relation between theory and practice more clearly. At the same time, since theoretical beliefs can translate to practical ones, this shows how the practical application of theoretical science can be used for any purpose, good or ill. I show how Peirce uses an Aristotelian strategy to identify a highest end as a test of the moral character of practical maxims, namely, whether the means and ends derived from the maxim are conducive to that end.

Every football statue transcends mere physical representation; it stands as a public monument constructed to commemorate and honor specific subjects. The football statue involves an intricate interplay of communication factors and functions, potentially transforming into a message imbued with encyclopedic signs to serve its communicative purposes. Importantly, the football statue, as a communication phenomenon, extends beyond a simple semiotic relation between the statue and a viewer. We must also consider the addresser’s intentions, including strategies for engaging the viewer as an addressee. This duality involves referencing both historical and spatial contexts (the physical environment) beyond the message itself. And various semiotic means – also poetic – capture the viewer’s attention and maintain contact. We understand the semiotics of football statues from the perspectives of Eco (encyclopedia, intentio auctoris , model reader), Jakobson (communication model), Peirce (icon, index, symbol, collateral experience), and Barthes (relay, anchorage). Our analytical descriptions/examples solely concern UK statuary after an examination of 89 statues.