Basel Committee on Banking Supervision

Part I of this project overviewed the literature on the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS) and provided a primer on the Committee’s governance and functions. It also engaged with the current theories on legitimacy and discussed what legitimacy meant for the global governance of banking and how it could be assessed. This part investigates the BCBS’s governance, operation, and policy outcomes to determine the extent to which it is and has been legitimate. The assessment is conducted based on three principles of reasoned decision making, transparency, and accountability. Maziar Peihani argues that the BCBS has gradually become a more legitimate institution but there still exists significant room for improvement. He highlights a number of areas for reform and sets out policy prescriptions to enhance the BCBS’s legitimacy.

Maziar Peihani, Ph.D. (2015), University of British Columbia, is a post-doctoral fellow with the International Law Program at the Centre for International Governance Innovation. He has published on law and regulation of banking, including a recent paper on bank resolution in the Annual Insolvency Law Review (2016).