Manchester University Press
4 ‘What, no chair for me?’
Abstract
This chapter challenges the common wisdom that appeasement was entrenched in the pragmatic, conciliatory and reasonable British approach to conflict resolution which assumes that unless national interests are deleteriously affected, the peaceful settlement of disputes is preferable to war. Instead, it focuses on the repercussions of the deliberate exclusion from the Munich Conference of the Soviet Union, arguably the key player in the events leading to war. It will contend that British policy reflected a priori principles and choices. Indeed, the existence of a viable Soviet alternative in 1938 is validated by the extensive Russian archival sources now available, sustained by the diary kept by Ivan Maisky, Soviet ambassador to London (1932–43). The diary reveals how the legacy of two centuries of imperial rivalry between the two countries, enhanced by anti-communism and the post-Russian Revolution ‘red scare,’ raised an insurmountable obstacle to an anti-Hitler alliance during and after the Munich Conference. The chapter will show how pessimistic assessments, writing off the Soviet Union as a potential ally against Germany, emanated from embedded and preconceived attitudes. It will also expose the pivotal role of human agency; indeed, Maisky’s diary reveals how much room for manoeuvre was left for diplomats, even under Stalin’s authoritarian regime. This is a facet of Soviet politics entirely missing in Western historiography, where personalities are largely anonymous and the impact of personal friendships, conflicts and rivalries within the Kremlin, even at the peak of Stalin’s terror and purges, are often overlooked.
Abstract
This chapter challenges the common wisdom that appeasement was entrenched in the pragmatic, conciliatory and reasonable British approach to conflict resolution which assumes that unless national interests are deleteriously affected, the peaceful settlement of disputes is preferable to war. Instead, it focuses on the repercussions of the deliberate exclusion from the Munich Conference of the Soviet Union, arguably the key player in the events leading to war. It will contend that British policy reflected a priori principles and choices. Indeed, the existence of a viable Soviet alternative in 1938 is validated by the extensive Russian archival sources now available, sustained by the diary kept by Ivan Maisky, Soviet ambassador to London (1932–43). The diary reveals how the legacy of two centuries of imperial rivalry between the two countries, enhanced by anti-communism and the post-Russian Revolution ‘red scare,’ raised an insurmountable obstacle to an anti-Hitler alliance during and after the Munich Conference. The chapter will show how pessimistic assessments, writing off the Soviet Union as a potential ally against Germany, emanated from embedded and preconceived attitudes. It will also expose the pivotal role of human agency; indeed, Maisky’s diary reveals how much room for manoeuvre was left for diplomats, even under Stalin’s authoritarian regime. This is a facet of Soviet politics entirely missing in Western historiography, where personalities are largely anonymous and the impact of personal friendships, conflicts and rivalries within the Kremlin, even at the peak of Stalin’s terror and purges, are often overlooked.
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Front matter i
- Contents v
- List of figures vii
- List of contributors viii
- Introduction 1
- 1 Czechoslovakia, Czecho-Slovakia and the Munich Agreement 19
- 2 A very long shadow 44
- 3 ‘Curs yapping round the dying stag’, or the rituals of fractured societies 66
- 4 ‘What, no chair for me?’ 90
- 5 Churchill, Munich and the origins of the Grand Alliance 112
- 6 Munich and the unexpected rise of American power 133
- 7 Mussolini, Munich and the Italian people 153
- 8 ‘England is pro-Hitler’ 171
- 9 Munich and the masses 192
- 10 Melanie Klein and the coming of the Second World War 213
- 11 The poet’s perspective on the Munich Crisis 234
- 12 Public opinion, policy makers and the Munich Crisis 251
- 13 France in the ‘blue light’ of Munich 273
- Index 296
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Front matter i
- Contents v
- List of figures vii
- List of contributors viii
- Introduction 1
- 1 Czechoslovakia, Czecho-Slovakia and the Munich Agreement 19
- 2 A very long shadow 44
- 3 ‘Curs yapping round the dying stag’, or the rituals of fractured societies 66
- 4 ‘What, no chair for me?’ 90
- 5 Churchill, Munich and the origins of the Grand Alliance 112
- 6 Munich and the unexpected rise of American power 133
- 7 Mussolini, Munich and the Italian people 153
- 8 ‘England is pro-Hitler’ 171
- 9 Munich and the masses 192
- 10 Melanie Klein and the coming of the Second World War 213
- 11 The poet’s perspective on the Munich Crisis 234
- 12 Public opinion, policy makers and the Munich Crisis 251
- 13 France in the ‘blue light’ of Munich 273
- Index 296
