Insider Threats

"This compendium of research on insider threats is essential reading for all personnel with accountabilities for security; it shows graphically the extent and persistence of the threat that all organizations face and against which they must take preventive measures."

— Roger Howsley, Executive Director, World Institute for Nuclear Security

High-security organizations around the world face devastating threats from insiders—trusted employees with access to sensitive information, facilities, and materials. From Edward Snowden to the Fort Hood shooter to the theft of nuclear materials, the threat from insiders is on the front page and at the top of the policy agenda. Insider Threats offers detailed case studies of insider disasters across a range of different types of institutions, from biological research laboratories, to nuclear power plants, to the U.S. Army. Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan outline cognitive and organizational biases that lead organizations to downplay the insider threat, and they synthesize "worst practices" from these past mistakes, offering lessons that will be valuable for any organization with high security and a lot to lose.

Insider threats pose dangers to anyone who handles information that is secret or proprietary, material that is highly valuable or hazardous, people who must be protected, or facilities that might be sabotaged. This is the first book to offer in-depth case studies across a range of industries and contexts, allowing entities such as nuclear facilities and casinos to learn from each other. It also offers an unprecedented analysis of terrorist thinking about using insiders to get fissile material or sabotage nuclear facilities.

Contributors: Matthew Bunn, Harvard University; Andreas Hoelstad Dæhli, Oslo; Kathryn M. Glynn, IBM Global Business Services;

Thomas Hegghammer, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, Oslo; Austin Long, Columbia University; Scott D. Sagan, Stanford University; Ronald Schouten, Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard Medical School; Jessica Stern, Harvard University; Amy B. Zegart, Stanford University

Matthew Bunn is Professor of Practice at the Harvard Kennedy School. He is coeditor of Transforming U.S. Energy Innovation. Scott D. Sagan is Caroline S. G. Munro Professor of Political Science, Mimi and Peter Haas University Fellow in Undergraduate Education, and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He is coeditor of Planning the Unthinkable and the author of The Limits of Safety, among other books.

Insider Threats is well-written, even literary. Its chief lesson: organizations are rarely designed to catch the insider, and much work needs to be done to protect them.

Roger Howsley, Executive Director, World Institute for Nuclear Security:

This compendium of research on insider threats is essential reading for all personnel with accountabilities for security; it shows graphically the extent and persistence of the threat that all organizations face and against which they must take preventive measures.

James J. Wirtz, Dean, School of International Graduate Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, coeditor of Strategy in the Contemporary World:

Bureaucracies find it difficult to detect and mitigate insider threats. Once a problem emerges, they tend to tighten existing security measures while avoiding fundamental reforms that address real weaknesses. Insider Threats highlights how a variety of organizations have failed to address this security challenge and draws lessons for the most critical sector of all – the nuclear power industry. Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan have produced a landmark study that redefines our understanding of safety and security when it comes to both the civilian and military nuclear complex. The organizational pathologies they identify are simply too dangerous to be ignored.