Cornell University Press
Reassuring the Reluctant Warriors
About this book
Why did American leaders work hard to secure multilateral approval from the United Nations or NATO for military interventions in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, while making only limited efforts to gain such approval for the 2003 Iraq War? In Reassuring the Reluctant Warriors, Stefano Recchia draws on declassified documents and about one hundred interviews with civilian and military leaders to illuminate little-known aspects of U.S. decision making in the run-up to those interventions. American leaders, he argues, seek UN or NATO approval to facilitate sustained military and financial burden sharing and ensure domestic support. However, the most assertive, hawkish, and influential civilian leaders in Washington tend to downplay the costs of intervention, and when confronted with hesitant international partners they often want to bypass multilateral bodies. In these circumstances, America's senior generals and admirals—as reluctant warriors who worry about Vietnam-style quagmires—can play an important restraining role, steering U.S. policy toward multilateralism.
Senior military officers are well placed to debunk the civilian interventionists' optimistic assumptions regarding the costs of war, thereby undermining broader governmental support for intervention. Recchia demonstrates that when the military expresses strong concerns about the stabilization burden, even hawkish civilian leaders can be expected to work hard to secure multilateral support through the UN or NATO—if only to reassure the reluctant warriors about long-term burden sharing. By contrast, when the military stays silent, as it did in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq War, the most hawkish civilians are empowered; consequently, the United States is more likely to bypass multilateral bodies and may end up shouldering a heavy stabilization burden largely by itself. Recchia's argument that the military has the ability to contribute not only to a more prudent but also to a more multilateralist U.S. intervention policy may be counterintuitive, but the evidence is compelling.
Author / Editor information
Stefano Recchia is Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Cambridge. He is coeditor of Just and Unjust Military Intervention. Further information about his research is available at: www.stefanorecchia.net.
Reviews
Stefano Recchia has done a masterful job documenting and analyzing the formulation of National Security Policy by the Principals of the National Security Council. His analysis is sound and he provides clear insight into all the arguments for the various courses of action advanced by the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and others involved in making recommendations to the Commander-in-Chief.
Joseph M. Grieco, Duke University:
The United States often seeks support from multilateral bodies like the UN Security Council and NATO before launching humanitarian interventions or using military force to change the political institutions of foreign nations. Why? Stefano Recchia in Reassuring the Reluctant Warriors puts forward an original answer to this enduring question. He shows that pro-force civilian policymakers often seek international authorization in order to mollify the government's chief reluctant warriors, for example, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the service chiefs, who for their part look to such external authorization as insurance that U.S. forces will enjoy foreign burden-sharing and sustained domestic political support. In exploring this subject Recchia is persuasive in presenting his own arguments; he is judicious in his engagement of alternative explanations; and he is rigorous in his deployment of a wide range of cases spanning the entire post-Cold War period. Scholars of international relations and specialists in foreign policy alike will welcome and build upon this book for years to come.
Gregory S. Newbold, Lieutenant General, USMC, Ret.:
Like a skilled forensic scientist, Stefano Recchia dissects and refutes the conventional wisdom about how national security decisions are made in the U.S. By doing so, he contributes greatly not only to an understanding of 'How did it happen?' but even more importantly to how to create a mature national security process in the future.
David M. Edelstein, Georgetown University, author of Occupational Hazards: Success and Failure in Military Occupation:
In Reassuring the Reluctant Warriors, Stefano Recchia addresses an important question: Why does the United States pursue multilateral military interventions when it ostensibly has the military capabilities to carry out these interventions on its own? Recchia's original answer to the question is an important contribution to the more general literature on military intervention and U.S. foreign policy in the post–Cold War era. Recchia conducted an impressive number of interviews with many of the key decision makers involved in the post–Cold War interventions about which he writes.
Topics
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Frontmatter
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Contents
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Preface
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Abbreviations
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Introduction: Multilateralism and the Generals
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1. The Value of Multilateral Legitimacy
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2. Institutions, Burden Sharing, and the American Military
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3. Haiti, 1993–94: Multilateral Approval to Ensure a UN Handoff
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4. Bosnia, 1992–95: Keeping the U.S. Military from “Owning” It
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5. Kosovo, 1998–99: Reassuring the Generals With NATO’s Buy-In
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6. Iraq, 2002–3: Silence from the Generals
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Conclusion
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Appendix: List of Officials Interviewed
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References
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Index
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