Home History 23. Derivative Clearinghouses: Collateral Management and Policy Implications
Chapter
Licensed
Unlicensed Requires Authentication

23. Derivative Clearinghouses: Collateral Management and Policy Implications

  • Agostino Capponi
View more publications by Columbia University Press
After the Crash
This chapter is in the book After the Crash
© 2019 Columbia University Press

© 2019 Columbia University Press

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter i
  2. CONTENTS vii
  3. FOREWORD xi
  4. PREFACE xiii
  5. 1. Introduction: Overview of the Financial Crisis and Its Impacts 1
  6. PART I. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN PERSPECTIVE
  7. 2. If “It” Happened Again: A Road Map for Regulatory Reform 47
  8. 3. Trends and Delegation in U.S. Financial Market Regulation 57
  9. 4. We Did Not Repeat the Errors of the Past: Lessons Drawn from the Fed’s Policy During the Great Depression 82
  10. 5. Regulation and Competition in the EU Financial Sector 98
  11. 6. Trends in Financial Market Regulation 121
  12. PART II. CREATING THE RIGHT (DIS)INCENTIVES
  13. 7. Progress and Challenges After the Financial Crisis 127
  14. 8. Banks and Tax Havens: First Evidence Based on Country-by-Country Reporting 135
  15. 9. “Dynamic Precaution” in Maintaining Financial Stability: The Importance of FSOC 144
  16. PART III. USE AND (AB)USE OF MODELS IN PREDICTING FINANCIAL OUTCOMES
  17. 10. Reflections on the Global Financial Crisis Ten Years On 167
  18. 11. The Right Way to Use Models 183
  19. 12. The Fundamental Volatility of the Digital Economy as a Contributor to Financial Instability 200
  20. 13. The Impact of Regulation on Systemic Risk 209
  21. 14. Big Data, Process Scalability, and Financial Stability 228
  22. PART IV. REGULATING FOR THE NEXT CRISIS?
  23. 15. Rules Versus Principles in Financial Regulation Following the Crisis: It All Depends on the Purpose 237
  24. 16. How to Regulate in Times of Crisis 258
  25. 17. The Economic and Political Implications of the Dodd-Frank Act 261
  26. 18. The Regulatory Sine Curve: What Explains the Retreat from Systemic Risk Regulation (and Why It Was Predictable) 281
  27. 19. Roundtable: It’s Not Too Much or Too Little Regulation; It’s Getting It Right 301
  28. PART V. THE ORIGINS OF THE NEXT FINANCIAL CRISIS
  29. 20. Interview: Striking the Right Balance between Markets and Regulation 333
  30. 21. Money Market Funds After the Onset of the Crisis 341
  31. 22. The 2017 Tax Act’s Potential Impact on Bank Safety and Capitalization 360
  32. 23. Derivative Clearinghouses: Collateral Management and Policy Implications 371
  33. Concluding Remarks 384
  34. CONTRIBUTORS 391
  35. INDEX 401
Downloaded on 7.9.2025 from https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.7312/ohal19284-025/html
Scroll to top button