Bristol University Press
6 Coercive Engagement: Lessons from US Policy towards China
Abstract
In 1996 the U.S. convinced China to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), even though this treaty materially disadvantaged China’s nuclear weapons program. Why did U.S. engagement initiatives—without invoking coercive material measures and offering side payments—succeeded in prodding Beijing to do something that caused damage to its relative power position? This chapter argues that the normative mechanism through which engagement influences Beijing is not socialization. Rather, it argues that engagement works through a realist-constructivist mechanism that several scholars call “rhetorical coercion” or “rhetorical entrapment.” By appealing to the commitments to which Beijing has agreed in public, America and its allies locked Chinese leaders in their own words, leaving them unable to continue with policies contrary to the “peaceful rise” or “peaceful development” discourses they have proposed before international audiences. The case illustrates a realist-constructivism by showing what may be called coercive engagement.
Abstract
In 1996 the U.S. convinced China to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), even though this treaty materially disadvantaged China’s nuclear weapons program. Why did U.S. engagement initiatives—without invoking coercive material measures and offering side payments—succeeded in prodding Beijing to do something that caused damage to its relative power position? This chapter argues that the normative mechanism through which engagement influences Beijing is not socialization. Rather, it argues that engagement works through a realist-constructivist mechanism that several scholars call “rhetorical coercion” or “rhetorical entrapment.” By appealing to the commitments to which Beijing has agreed in public, America and its allies locked Chinese leaders in their own words, leaving them unable to continue with policies contrary to the “peaceful rise” or “peaceful development” discourses they have proposed before international audiences. The case illustrates a realist-constructivism by showing what may be called coercive engagement.
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Front Matter i
- Contents iii
- Notes on Contributors iv
- Realist Constructivism: An Introduction 1
- Causation in Realist Constructivism: Interactionality, Emergence and the Need for Interpretation 19
- Constructivist and Neoclassical Realisms 47
- Huadu: A Realist Constructivist Account of Taiwan’s Anomalous Status 73
- The India–US Nuclear Deal: Norms of Power and the Power of Norms 101
- Coercive Engagement: Lessons from US Policy towards China 123
- Taking Co-constitution Seriously: Explaining an Ambiguous US Approach to Latin America 145
- The Bridging Capacity of Realist Constructivism: The Normative Evolution of Human Security and the Responsibility to Protect 171
- Permutations and Combinations in Theorizing Global Politics: Whither Realist Constructivism? 193
- Saving Realist Prudence 217
- Index 233
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Front Matter i
- Contents iii
- Notes on Contributors iv
- Realist Constructivism: An Introduction 1
- Causation in Realist Constructivism: Interactionality, Emergence and the Need for Interpretation 19
- Constructivist and Neoclassical Realisms 47
- Huadu: A Realist Constructivist Account of Taiwan’s Anomalous Status 73
- The India–US Nuclear Deal: Norms of Power and the Power of Norms 101
- Coercive Engagement: Lessons from US Policy towards China 123
- Taking Co-constitution Seriously: Explaining an Ambiguous US Approach to Latin America 145
- The Bridging Capacity of Realist Constructivism: The Normative Evolution of Human Security and the Responsibility to Protect 171
- Permutations and Combinations in Theorizing Global Politics: Whither Realist Constructivism? 193
- Saving Realist Prudence 217
- Index 233
