19. Physicalism and the Multiple Readability of Mental States

Chapters in this book

1. Frontmatter i
2. Preface v
3. Contents vii
4. Introduction What Is Philosophy of Psychology? 1
5. Part One. Behaviorism
6. Introduction: Behaviorism 11
7. 1. The Logical Analysis of Psychology 14
8. 2. Brains and Behavior 24
9. 3. Selections from Science and Human Behavior 37
10. 4. A Review of B. F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior 48
11. Part Two. Reductionism and Physicalism
12. Materialism without Reductionism: What Physicalism Does Not Entail 67
13. 5. Mental Events 107
14. 6. Special Sciences, or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis 120
15. 7. Philosophy and Our Mental Life 134
16. 8. Excerpt from “Identity and Necessity” 144
17. 9. Identity, Necessity, and Events 148
18. 10. Anomalous Monism and Kripke's Cartesian Intuitions 156
19. 11. What Is It Like to Be a Bat? 159
20. Part Three. Functionalism
21. Introduction: What Is Functionalism? 171
22. Functional Analysis 185
23. 12. Functional Analysis 185
24. Functional Specification 191
25. 13. The Nature of Mind 191
26. 14. Armstrong on the Mind 200
27. 15. Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications 207
28. 16. Mad Pain and Martian Pain 216
29. Functional State Identity Theory 223
30. 17. The Nature of Mental States 223
31. 18. Review of Putnam 232
32. 19. Physicalism and the Multiple Readability of Mental States 234
33. 20. What Psychological States Are Not 237
34. 21. Functionalism and Qualia 251
35. 22. Troubles with Functionalism 268
36. Index 307