Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Frontmatter i
2. Contents vii
3. Preface ix
4. PART ONE: No Morality: “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958)
5. 1. Virtue Ethics, Eudaimonism, and the Greeks 3
6. 2. The Invention of “ Morality” and the Possibility of Consequentialism 24
7. 3. The Misguided Project of Vindicating Morality 31
8. 4. The Futility of Seeking the Extension of a Word with No Intension 52
9. 5. What’s Really Wrong with the Vocabulary of Morality? 67
10. 6. Assessing “Modern Moral Philosophy” 84
11. PART TWO: No Self: “The First Person” (1975)
12. 7. The Circularity Problem for Accounts of “I” as a Device of Self-Reference 95
13. 8. Is the Fundamental Reference Rule for “I” the Key to Explaining First-Person Self-Reference? 102
14. 9. Rumfitt’s Solution to the Circularity Problem 118
15. 10. Can We Make Sense of a Nonreferential Account of “I”? 138
16. 11. Strategies for Saving “I” as a Singular Term: Domesticating FP and Deflating Reference 151
17. Epilogue: The Anti-Cartesian Basis of Anscombe’s Skepticism 177
18. APPENDIX A. Aquinas and Natural Law 181
19. APPENDIX B. Stoic Ethics: A Law Conception without Commandments? 191
20. Notes 199
21. References 223
22. Acknowledgments 231
23. Index 233